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INTRODUCTION
In a now famous 1996 article Judge Easterbrook wrote that there is no
“Law of Cyberspace” any more than there is “Law of the Horse.”1 What he
meant is that there is no distinct body of law that concerns itself exclusively
with cyberspace any more than there is a distinct body of law that concerns
itself with horses. There are laws that regulate the sale of horses, there are
laws that regulate what happens when people are kicked by horses, and so
on, but there is no law of the horse as such. Similarly, in the cyberspace
domain, contracts in cyberspace are regulated by contracts law, torts in
cyberspace are regulated by tort law, and so on, but there is no such thing as
cyberspace law. The best way—he argued—to understand and regulate
“specialized endeavors is to study general rules.”2 In that sense, to para-
phrase him, there are no special rules on digital exclusion, i.e. the act of
foreclosing from digital markets rivals to increase one’s power, any more
than there are for digital horses; digital exclusion is regulated by the same
rules as exclusion in other markets.
The response came soon enough from Professor Lessig, who, in an
equally famous article, wrote that “[w]e see something when we think about
the regulation of cyberspace that other areas would not show us.”3 His argu-
ment concerned “the limits on law as a regulator” in cyberspace in view of a
new source of regulation, namely the code (i.e. the software and hardware)
that makes up cyberspace itself.4 Lessig’s claim was not that regular laws do
not apply in cyberspace, but that the existence of code as an additional ele-
ment inherent in cyberspace makes the regulation of cyberspace unique.5
As claims and cases against technology giants that foreclose their com-
petitors have recently multiplied,6 this Article piggybacks on the successful
framing of this debate and borrows the core claim of both: the specific tools
and rules we use to analyze and regulate exclusionary practices in digital
markets are the same as in any other market; we do not need to re-invent the
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 UNIV. CHIC.
LEG. FORUM 207 (1996). Easterbrook attributed the phrase to Gerhard Casper, a former dean
of the University of Chicago Law School. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Retirement of Sheldon
Messinger, 80 CALIF. LAW REV. 307, 310 (1992).
2. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207.
3. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
LAW REV. 507, 502 (1999).
4. Id at 502.
5. Lessig clarifies that he does not make a general argument about all specialized ar-
eas; just cyberspace. Id. at 502.
6. Of the numerous recent appeals to control the monopolistic tendencies of large high
technology corporations. See, e.g., Nick Srnicek, We Need to Nationalise Google, Facebook
and Amazon. Here’s Why, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 30, 2017; Ellen Goodman & Julia Powles,
Facebook and Google: Most Powerful and Secretive Empires We’ve Ever Known, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 28, 2016; Jonathan Taplin, Can the Tech Giants Be Stopped?, THE WALL
STREET J., July 14, 2017; Editorial, A Giant Problem: The Rise of the Corporate Colossus
Threatens Both Competition and the Legitimacy of Business, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2016.
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wheel.7 However, the function and nature of exclusion in digital markets is
affected by the technology-intensive character of such markets in ways that
are not encountered in other industries. These considerations are specific to
digital exclusion, and work collectively to define every case of exclusion
that arises in digital markets. In that sense, digital exclusion is indeed unique
and merits special attention.
I am, of course, not the first to point out that exclusion in high technol-
ogy environments requires a different treatment of some sort. Anticompeti-
tive practices in digital markets have attracted the attention of many
influential scholars.8 But I distinguish the relevant literature from the contri-
bution sought here in two important regards: first, extant scholarship has
focused almost exclusively on the economic aspects and special features of
exclusion in digital markets, not the technological ones.9 This is rather sur-
prising, because as a matter of order it is technological capabilities and limi-
tations that define what the transactional overlay can be, not the other way
around. Economists start from the premise that “in the beginning there [are]
markets,”10 but in markets where the high technology element is prominent,
which market actors, transactional interactions, and options are available,
and under which conditions, is largely dependent on what is technically pos-
sible.11 To a large degree technology forms the underlying playing field on
7. Cf. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century
Discipline Addresses 21st Century Problems, 4 TEX. REV. L. POL’Y 129, 133 (1999) (“I be-
lieve antitrust should-indeed must-continue to apply. None of the ‘high-tech differences’ justi-
fies a complete or even substantial exemption.”). See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust
Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 859 (1998).
8. See David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis
in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 801 (1998); Pitofsky, supra note 7;
Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 192
(2000); DANIEL SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECO-
NOMICS AND LAW (2009); Dennis W Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying
to Create and Preserve Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002);
Rubinfeld, supra note 7; John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time:
Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157 (1999);
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
LAW J. 1 (2001); Nicholas Economides, Antitrust Issues in Network Industries, in THE REFORM
OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES 1, 343-376 (Ioannis Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris
eds., 2010).
9. For a notable exception see SPULBER & YOO, supra note 8. Yochai Benkler’s work
is also relevant, notably Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of
the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. TECH. 287 (1997).
10. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 87 (1985).
11. See Michael G Jacobides, Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration: How
and Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 465 (2005); Richard N
Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 19 (2002);
Jeffrey T. Macher & David C. Mowery, Vertical Specialization and Industry Structure in High
Tech Industries, 21 ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT. 317 (2004).
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which business relations are built,12 and technological capabilities are re-
flected in transactional and organizational structures (“mirroring hypothe-
sis”).13 To say, for instance, that an integrated dominant firm (e.g. an
incumbent telecommunications provider) might be constrained by entry in
one of the layers in which it is present (e.g. services and applications), is a
judgement on a business/economic outcome of interest to regulators and an-
titrust courts, which, however, presupposes that the various layers of the
production chain have, as a matter of technical feasibility, been decoupled/
unbundled so that entry can occur in one layer only instead of the entire
value chain, a significantly more difficult scenario, which will attract a
wholly different assessment.
The claim that technology serves as the foundation of economic activity
in technology-dependent markets, and that therefore it is intricately tied with
the regulation of economic activity, is not an implicit adoption of a deter-
ministic view of technology. It is well acknowledged that the direction of
technological evolution is infused with socioeconomic and political choices,
and that in every design various considerations—technical and non-techni-
cal—are embedded and serve as influential determinants of whether a design
will be accepted or rejected.14 But whatever the preparatory work that goes
into a design, once formed, it will in turn enable or constrain business prac-
tices and opportunities, including exclusionary ones. Not only that, but the
technical design may itself incorporate business practices or agreements that
used to be performed through the market mechanism (e.g. technical integra-
tion in lieu of contractual tying).15 As technology changes, and enables addi-
tional and different designs, so does the competitive fabric of the industry.
Therefore, the idea that one can form a complete picture of digital exclusion
without accounting for the effect of technology on the competitive condi-
tions in the market is arguably an incomplete analysis. To the contrary, a
12. David D. Clark, John Wroclawski, Karen R. Sollins & Robert Braden, Tussle in
Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow’s Internet, 13 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING
462 (2005) (where the author describes how communications networks should be seen by
engineers as designing the playing field, not the outcome).
13. Lyra Colfer & Carliss Baldwin, The Mirroring Hypothesis: Theory, Evidence, and
Exceptions, (Harv. Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 1-124, 2016; Anna Cabigiosu &
Arnaldo Camuffo, Beyond the “Mirroring” Hypothesis: Product Modularity and Interor-
ganizational Relations in the Air Conditioning Industry, 23 ORG. SCI. 686 (2012); Alan Mac-
Cormack, Carliss Baldwin & John Rusnak, Exploring the Duality Between Product and
Organizational Architectures: A Test of the “Mirroring” Hypothesis, 41 RES. POLICY 1309
(2012).
14. ROBIN MANSELL, THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NET-
WORK EVOLUTION 2-4, 34-38 (1994) (where the author explains that very design consists of
rules that forge the relationships among the partaking actors, and even seemingly neutral deci-
sions change the constellation of interactions and redefine the distribution of power among
actors).
15. KEVIN COATES, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY MARKETS
241–42 (2011).
Spring 2018] Exclusion in Digital Markets 185
thorough understanding of the industry’s technological features that are rele-
vant to antitrust is really the only way to draw economic and policy implica-
tions. This Article fills that gap.
The second way by which this study differs from extant literature is that
most of the scholarly work so far has focused on specific issues in the analy-
sis of digital exclusion, as opposed to overarching cross-cutting factors.16
For instance, a line of scholarly work has focused on the steps of exclusion
analysis, e.g., how to perform market definition,17 or how to identify and
appreciate efficiencies.18 Another strand has focused on specific offenses,
e.g. predation or tying.19 Yet a third stream has focused on specific indus-
tries, e.g. software20 or telecommunications.21 The value of these insights is
undisputed, but by maintaining a narrow focus, existing literature tends to
sideline broader considerations that define the overall function and effects of
exclusion in digital markets. Of those, I identify three: first, supply and de-
mand conditions in digital markets that affect sources of competition and
substitutability; second, factors and empirical metadata on, the durability of
competitive advantage in digital markets; and third, the nature of digital ex-
clusion as a monopolization tactic as contrasted with normal on the merits
competition.
These three themes are influential factors in every case of exclusionary
practice, because they help determine the ability of the challenged practice
to bring about anticompetitive effects, an essential component in antitrust
analysis. Indeed, the importance of overarching factors, like the ones above,
cannot be overstated. They relate to the broader competitive conditions in
the market and therefore are cross-cutting and go beyond each individual
step in the analysis of exclusion; they illuminate exclusion’s general position
in industrial organization, namely the extent to which exclusion is in tension
with the competitiveness of (digital) markets; and they can signal to market
16. Many of the articles cited supra note 7 discuss in varying degrees of detail general
features of digital markets as they pertain to exclusion. But these—to return to my first point—
focus on economics, not technology.
17. See, e.g., David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust
Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECON. 1-49
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002); Christopher Pleatsikas & David Teece, The Analysis of
Market Definition and Market Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation, 19 INT. J. IND. ORG.
665–93 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Konstantinos Stylianou, Systemic Efficiencies in Competition Law: Evi-
dence from the ICT Industry, 12 J. COMPET. LAW ECON. 557 (2016).
19. See, e.g., Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 17; Michael Whinston, Exclusivity and
Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 63
(2001).
20. See, e.g., Schmalensee, supra note 8; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in
Software Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST
IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 29 (Jeffery A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
21. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS (MUNICH LECTURES) (2001).
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actors what kind of competition they can and cannot engage in. Further, they
map onto the existing analytical framework of exclusion, and as such they
respond to Easterbrook’s call for reliance on existing general-purpose tools,
but are examined here under the technology prism, thereby also responding
to Lessig’s call for consideration of the digital exceptionalism.
Recasting the framework of exclusion in digital markets is necessary not
simply for the sake of organizing and codifying the additional considerations
suggested herein as a matter of theory, but chiefly to set exclusion on the
right dimensions as a matter of practice. Exclusionary practices have a long
and troubled history in regulatory and antitrust circles. They have tradition-
ally been regarded with suspicion, and it was not until the rise of the Chi-
cago School that courts and authorities—having been convinced by the
economic analysis of modern industrial organization—began to tolerate ex-
clusion.22 But even if, as a general matter, exclusionary practices today are
considered a priori neutral and are governed by the rule of reason, exclusion
in digital markets arguably still carries a stigma. Digital markets are often
associated with claims for openness, sharing, and non-discrimination, all of
which are in tension with exclusion. The recent aggressive net neutrality
rules23 and the close scrutiny of data interconnection agreements in the Open
Internet Order,24 the recurrent antitrust investigations against tying and inte-
gration (e.g., the Microsoft and Google cases),25 and the highly precaution-
ary concessions in merger approvals (e.g., the SBC/Ameritech merger)26 are
22. Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 11 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
23. As explained briefly infra footnotes 94-95 and accompanying text, the adopted rules
in the US and the EU were stricter than other alternatives that were considered but rejected.
Compare In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14–28
(2015) (Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order), ¶¶ 14-18 (hereinafter
Open Internet Order) and In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN
Docket No. 14-28 (2014) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), ¶¶ 116-136 (hereinafter Open
Internet NPRM). See also Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and
amending Directive 2002/22/EC, art. 3 (hereinafter Open Internet Regulation).
24. For the first time, the Open Internet Order gives the FCC the power to supervise
data interconnection agreements on the Internet. See Open Internet Order, supra note 23, at
194-206.
25. European Commission Press Release IP/15/4780, Antitrust: Commission sends
Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service; opens separate formal
investigation on Android (Apr. 15, 2015).
26. To alleviate foreclosure concerns the concessions included the obligation to create a
separate affiliate for advanced services (i.e. broadband Internet), and access to loop informa-
tion. See SBC Communications Inc./Ameritech, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC
Rcd. 14712, App. C – Conditions, paras 1 et seq., 19 et seq. (1999).
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all examples of policies that show a fundamental fear of exclusion. Even the
public at large seems to be suspicious of exclusionary practices.27
It is not the purpose of this Article to conclude definitively on whether
this fear is justified in each particular case; but the collective reading of the
considerations presented herein does cast a certain measure of doubt. The
overall impression from factoring in the technology-intensive nature of digi-
tal markets is that exclusionary practices are less likely than assumed to be
harmful to the institutional process of competition. This is not to say that the
technological aspects of digital markets do not at the same time create new
opportunities for anticompetitive exclusion (e.g. technical integration can be
a more efficient tying mechanism than those available in physical commodi-
ties markets). But the reconceptualization of digital exclusion attempted here
suggests that, while technology may create new methods of exclusion in dig-
ital markets, its main and lasting effect is that it fundamentally changes the
nature of competition as a generalized condition in the market.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: a short introduction
to exclusion is offered in Part 2 for the purposes of laying down basic as-
sumptions, an analytical framework, and the overall ideological tone of the
article. Then Parts 3 to 6 discuss the relevant parameters in assessing when
digital exclusion can be anticompetitive. In particular, Parts 3 and 4 look
into the competitive conditions in the market and discuss mechanisms by
which the supply and demand sides of markets react to exclusionary prac-
tices to limit them. Part 5 concerns itself with another condition of anticom-
petitive exclusion, namely the requirement that the power to exclude and the
related exclusionary practice persist in time to a degree that regulatory or
antitrust intervention becomes necessary. Part 6 illuminates the exclusion’s
role as a business strategy in digital markets. The idea is that under the
special conditions of digital markets, some exclusionary practices may con-
27. A study that analyzed almost a million comments submitted at the 2014 Open In-
ternet proceedings, concluded that 99% of the comments were in favor of network neutrality.
See PRESS RELEASE, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM 800,000 PUBLIC
COMMENTS ON THE FCC’S NET NEUTRALITY PLAN? (Sept. 2, 2014), available at http://sunlight
foundation.com/blog/2014/09/02/what-can-we-learn-from-800000-public-comments-on-the-
fccs-net-neutrality-plan/. A similar study showed that 81% of survey participants opposes dis-
criminatory treatment on the Internet, and another one that “public opinion was overwhelm-
ingly pro net neutrality.” See also PRESS RELEASE, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE CENTER FOR
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, NATIONAL SURVEY SHOWS PUBLIC OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSES
INTERNET “FAST LANES” (Nov. 10, 2014), available at http://www.udel.edu/cpc/research/
fall2014/UD-CPC-NatAgenda2014PR_2014NetNeutrality.pdf; KNIGHT FOUNDATION, DECOD-
ING THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE: AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIA, PUBLIC COMMENT AND ADVO-
CACY ON OPEN INTERNET, available at http://www.knightfoundation.org/features/netneutrality,
In another example, when the T-Mobile/AT&T merger was announced, the two companies
faced a significant backlash from the public fearing that the resulting company would create
exclusionary pressures in the wireless market. For a summary see Wikipedia, Attempted
Purchase of T-Mobile USA by AT&T, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attempted_
purchase_of_T-Mobile_USA_by_AT%26T#Reception.
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stitute normal competition and not monopolization techniques, which would
remove them from the range of offenses regulators or antitrust authorities
would wish to pursue. Taken together these factors update and enrich the
general analytical framework used to assess exclusion.
I. EXCLUSION: WHAT WE KNOW
A. Definition and Taxonomy
Exclusion is a broad term that is used to describe a variety of business
practices and effects. Economists Rey and Tirole define exclusion as “a
dominant firm’s denial of proper access to an essential good it produces,
with the intent of extending monopoly power from that segment of the mar-
ket (the bottleneck segment) to an adjacent segment (the potentially compet-
itive segment).”28 From the definition it should be obvious that not every
“denial of proper access” is exclusionary—an important observation consid-
ering that competitors sometimes have the propensity to blame dominant
firms for their inability to compete successfully in the market. But the exact
conditions that need to be fulfilled are a point of contention.
The above definition provides some guidance, but perhaps because it
has its source in economics, it is not fully suited to the needs of antitrust
courts or regulatory authorities. For example, the element of intent is not
normally required,29 and extension of market power to a neighboring market
is not the only outcome excluding firms may hope for—preventing entry or
maintaining existing market power in a market can well be alternative goals
(and potentially problematic from a policy perspective).30 Legal definitions,
however, are not any more precise; they still define exclusion by recourse to
the practices by which it is performed, and the effects it causes. For instance,
Hovenkamp defines exclusionary conduct as that which consists of acts that
“are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly
power by impairing the opportunities of rivals, and that either (a) do not
benefit consumers at all; (b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer
benefits that the acts produce; or (c) produce harms disproportionate to the
resulting benefits.”31 I am not critiquing the lack of a universally accepted
definition here; I am merely noting the ambiguity, which creates the need for
28. Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 2145, 2145 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007).
29. Intent is usually only relevant in cases of attempted monopolization or used by
courts and authorities to better understand the exclusionary conduct but not as a constituent
element of the conduct itself. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 302–03 (4th ed. 2011).
30. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
31. HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 298-301. See also LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, WARREN
GRIMES & CHRISTOPHER SAGERS, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 111 et
seq. (3rd ed. 2016).
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some elaboration on the most common exclusionary practices and their
effects.
The manifestations of exclusionary practices can be diverse.32 What they
all have in common is that they make it harder or impossible for a competi-
tor to gain access to necessary inputs or distribution channels along the value
chain. Exclusion does not have to be complete, namely to result in full re-
fusal of access to an upstream or downstream input; it can also consist in
manipulating the conditions of access to an input to make access less profita-
ble or otherwise less advantageous for one actor relative to another (presum-
ably an affiliate of the excluding firm).33 Sometimes this is referred to as
discrimination.
Exclusion is commonly implemented through the following forms:34
Vertical integration: A firm can integrate into two or more produc-
tion stages. If one of the production stages controlled by the inte-
grated firm is a bottleneck (the effect of dominance), the firm can
harm its competitors in other production stages by blocking access
to the bottleneck market.35 To a very large extent, the chronicle of
the liberalization of the telecommunications market, for example, is
dominated by cases of such type of foreclosure. In 1913 the Justice
Department filed an antitrust suit against AT&T asking it to open up
its long-distance network to local exchange providers for fear that,
without access to long-distance service, these providers stood no
chance to compete against local AT&T service.36 In 1968 a private
complaint forced AT&T to open its network to “foreign attach-
ments” thereby paving the way to the emergence of the equipment
industry.37 AT&T’s breakup in 1984 was also animated by the con-
cern that local exchange providers would not be able to compete
against AT&T’s local service if AT&T’s integrated long distance
network continued to be a near-monopoly.38 In all these cases access
32. HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 313–14. Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, An-
ticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L. J.
209, 215–19 (1986) (who treat “disparate doctrines” such as tie-ins, exclusive dealings, long-
term contracts, refusal to deal, as a single phenomenon, namely vertical exclusion).
33. Rey & Tirole, supra note 28, at 2149–50.
34. Id. at 2148–50; See also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
193 (4th ed. 1990).
35. DENNIS W CARLTON & JEFFREY M PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
388–90 (1990). In other words, vertical integration and tying are only a concern when the
challenged firm has market power (and therefore serves as a bottleneck).
36. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Kingsbury Commitment, (Dec. 1913) (referring to the consent
decree between the United States and AT&T in 1913).
37. Carter v. AT&T, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968). See also Hush-A-Phone v. United States,
238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action 17-49 (D.N.J.
1956).
38. United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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to a segment of the network was deemed both essential for the sur-
vival of competitors, and blocked by the integrated actor.
Tying: Short of integration, a firm can tie the bottleneck product to
the competitive product with the intent to strengthen the competitive
product’s position in the market to the detriment of other products
in that market. If the tying is not exclusive, its effect is that it may
make competition for rivals harder, but if it is exclusive then rivals
are de facto foreclosed as they lose access to the essential bottleneck
market.39 For instance, Microsoft tied Internet Explorer to its Win-
dows operating system making it harder for alternative internet
browsers to compete, eventually forcing some of them (most nota-
bly Netscape) to extinction.40
Refusal to deal (or dealing on discriminatory terms): A firm con-
trolling a bottleneck part of the value chain can refuse to deal with
firms upstream or downstream, with the intent to promote a compet-
ing affiliate.41 Refusal to deal can be performed by refusing to trans-
act with an actor or by employing technological means to block the
interoperation of components, for example by making them incom-
patible.42 For example, Skype and Google Voice were initially
blocked on iPhone.  The two firms alleged that AT&T saw them as
potential competition to its own native voice service and agreed
with Apple (for whom AT&T was the exclusive partner carrier) to
have them blocked.
While exclusionary practices differ in terms of implementation, they are
all associated with common antitrust concerns, which are the motivating
force for scrutiny by courts and authorities. Exclusion can result in either a
complete inability of competitors to access an essential neighboring market,
product, or service, or in the creation of obstacles that place competitors at
an unfairly disadvantageous position. Under these circumstances, the ex-
cluding firm can expand its power to other segments of the market, while its
competitors may be squeezed to only a segment of the market, or be forced
to either exit the market or to turn to an inferior or costlier alternative.43
39. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 34, at 371.
40. See Nicholas Economides, The Incentive for Non-price Discrimination by an Input
Monopolist, 16 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 271, 272–3 (1998); Whinston, supra note 19.
41. SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 122–25.
42. Economides, supra note 40, at 272; Janusz Ordever, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 90 YALE L. J. 8 (1981).
43. Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regu-
lation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 7, ¶ 29-30
(EC). See HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP E. AREEDA, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles and Their Application, para. 756b7 (3d ed. 2006); KIP W. VISCUSI, JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 248–53 (4th
ed. 2005).
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Exclusion can also result in the creation of entry barriers in the market the
excluding firm wants to protect, thereby barring potential competitors from
expanding themselves. If the protected market is essential (e.g. to reach con-
sumers or to meet minimum efficient scale), entry barriers can result in com-
petitors even exiting neighboring markets.44
To illustrate, consider the following examples: a situation where the
downstream market consists of five firms, with firm A1 having 50% of the
market and the other four firms combined having the remaining 50%. The
upstream market consists also of five firms, but A1 decides to block one of
them, firm B1. Now B1 is in a disadvantageous position because it lost a
major distribution channel to consumers.45 This situation was prominently
discussed in the merger between Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting.46
Time Warner controlled more than 40% of the programming market,
whereas Turner and its affiliates controlled about a 30% share in cable distri-
bution, which would rise to about 45% after the merger. The fear was that
after the merger the Time Warner conglomerate might refuse to carry pro-
gramming by alternative producers thereby barring them from a large share
of the market.
Moreover, if the new scale of operations allowed by the residual de-
mand is insufficient to support B1, B1 may be forced to exit the market.47
This happened to Netscape internet browser. The Windows operating system
was the bottleneck product and Internet Explorer was the competitive prod-
uct, which attempted to take on the popular Netscape Navigator. Microsoft,
through tying, exclusive dealing contracts, zero-rate pricing, and other tac-
tics, asphyxiated Netscape’s revenue streams, eventually squeezing it out of
the market.48
Consider also a related hypothetical, whereby B1 provides a technologi-
cally advanced input that both A1 and its competitor, A2, use. A1 decides to
integrate (or a tactic of equivalent effect) with B1 and to block access of A2
to B1. Instead, A2 can only use the technologically inferior or costlier B2
input. With this policy A1 manages to raise A2’s costs of production and
make it less competitive. A similar effect would arise if A1, instead of block-
ing B1, sells it to A2 at a higher price (a price squeeze through price discrimi-
nation).49 Again, A2 incurs a higher cost of production compared to A1.
44. See SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 102–04.
45. See Id. at 116.
46. Time Warner, Inc. et al., Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public
Comment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50301 (F.T.C. 1996) (where “Time Warner, Turner, TCI and its sub-
sidiary Liberty Media Corp. have agreed to make a number of structural changes and to abide
by certain restrictions designed to break down the entry barriers created by the proposed
transaction.”).
47. See generally Economides, supra note 40, passim.
48. Richard J Gilbert & Michael L Katz, An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15
J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2001).
49. TIROLE, supra note 34, at 194.
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As mentioned, in a more dynamic view of the market, exclusionary con-
duct can also prevent entry.50 If potential entrants fear that they may be pre-
vented from using the bottleneck product or use it under discriminatory
terms, they may find it difficult to compete and therefore opt not to enter.51
The motivation for the exclusionary actor is to protect itself from competi-
tion both in the (potentially) competitive market and in the bottleneck mar-
ket: in the competitive market, because, without access to the bottleneck
product, potential entrants may be discouraged.52 A possible solution to this
problem would be to enter both the upstream and downstream levels of the
value chain so that a new entrant can exercise full control over its production
and distribution lines. But this solution can come with a considerable extra
cost, both in terms of the required time for a potential entrant to prepare, and
in terms of capital expenditures.53
Exclusion may also be sensible as a competitive strategy to protect the
bottleneck market, because preventing entry in the competitive segment may
hinder entrants from gaining the necessary foothold to subsequently expand
in the bottleneck market as well. This is more relevant in situations where
the bottleneck market requires significant investments and potential entrants
would rather take a gradual approach. A good example here is the “ladder of
investment” theory on which much of the European telecommunications in-
frastructure liberalization was based.54 The ladder of investment theory ex-
pressed the idea that, because the telecommunications market is capital-
intensive, entrants will only be able to expand gradually to the various layers
of telecommunications services. However, this would not be possible if they
could not initially gain access to the existing infrastructure of the incum-
bents. For this reason, the European Commission mandated that incumbents
offer open access to their networks under certain conditions that were aimed
to strike a fair balance between incumbents’ and entrants’ interests.
50. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, & VERNON, supra note 43, at 168–72.
51. Carlton & Waldman, supra note 8.
52. See TIROLE, supra note 34, at 51.
53. See Jonathan Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge the Chi-
cago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST LAW J. 645, 651 et seq. (1989); RICHARD POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 202 (2nd ed. 2009) (“the possibility that tying might discourage entry into the
monopolized market for the tying product cannot be excluded altogether.”); HOVENKAMP &
AREEDA, supra note 43, at ¶756(c)(3); see also Town of Concord Massachusetts v. Boston
Edison Company, 915 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Insofar as it is more difficult for a firm to
enter an industry at two levels than at one, the monopolist, by expanding its monopoly power,
has made entry by new firms more difficult.”).
54. Martin Cave, Encouraging Infrastructure Competition via the Ladder of Investment,
30 TELECOMM. POLICY 223 (2006); see also DR. KARL-HEINZ NEUMANN ET AL., WIK-CON-
SULT, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXISTING BROADBAND GUIDELINES (FINAL RE-
PORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMP/2011/006), at 163-65.
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B. Assessing Exclusion’s Threat to the Competitive Process
As mentioned, it is not contested here that the general framework availa-
ble to courts and regulators to assess the anticompetitive threat of exclusion-
ary practices is adequate. It has been in development for decades and is the
result of the fruitful exchange between economists and legal scholars.
Rather, the problem was identified to be that the different parts of the frame-
work do not reflect the role of technology, which, naturally, is decisive in
technology-intensive industries.55 This overlook risks yielding misleading
results on the necessity and intensity of ex ante regulatory action or ex post
antitrust enforcement.
This part provides a brief presentation of the existing framework. The
goal is to highlight the general parts of the framework onto which the addi-
tional technological considerations offered in this Article will be mapped.
Keeping the existing framework in place helps situate the contribution of
this Article in familiar territory.
1. The Modern Context of Anticompetitiveness
As a general matter, the question of which behavior is anticompetitive is
existential in antitrust law and regulation and almost impossible to answer
definitively.56 Potentially anticompetitive exclusionary conduct is no excep-
tion. That said, some basic tenets of the modern context of anticompetitive
exclusionary conduct should be noted here, as they serve as the underlying
principles of the framework in use. Without claiming that these principles
are universally accepted,57 they have and continue to enjoy wide adoption,
and for the purposes of this Article, I do not take issue with them.
For the most part, the philosophical core of exclusion was shaped by the
intellectual bras-de-fer between the Harvard school and the Chicago school
of industrial organization and antitrust.58 The Chicago school is thought to
55. See Introduction.
56. See generally, Eleanor Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices
and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST LAW J. 371 (2002).
57. The principles discussed here emanate from or were crystalized by the Chicago
school. That school of thought, however, was accused of showing excessive confidence in the
operation of markets, of failing to account for market realities, such as lack of perfect informa-
tion and switching costs, and of overstating efficiencies. Therefore, its assumptions and basic
principles are not universally accepted. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 73–77. Richard R.
Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1979); F. M. Scherer, The
Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff (Reviewing Antitrust Law: An Economic
Perspective by Richard Posner), 86 YALE L. J. 974 (1977); Herbert J Hovenkamp, The Reck-
oning of Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 1, 3
(Antonio Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 2002) (“The Chicago
School contribution to antitrust did two things. First, it gave us much that was useful. Second,
it was oversold.”).
58. For their diverging approaches compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967); ARTHUR BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION: A STUDY OF THE
EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1936); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION
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have emerged as the winner,59 with its basic assumptions becoming the foun-
dations for exclusionary analysis.
Perhaps the most basic insight of the Chicago style analysis on exclu-
sionary conduct is that it is not uniformly good or bad for the industry,60 the
general tendency being to condone rather than condemn it.61 It is true that
strategic exclusionary behavior can restrict competition, but it is also true
that numerous efficiency-generating practices involve exclusionary mea-
sures (e.g. exclusive dealing to prevent free riding).62 Therefore, it cannot be
said in the abstract that exclusionary conduct is acceptable or not; rather, a
review of the particular circumstances of the conduct and the industry is
necessary.63
Further, not all negative effects of exclusionary behavior should trigger
liability. It is now long established that aggressive but fair/legitimate compe-
tition, even if it results in foreclosure of competitors, is not only expected
but also welcome. As Judge Easterbrook has stated “injuries to rivals are
byproducts of vigorous competition” and therefore “to deter aggressive con-
duct is to deter competition.”64 In the same vein, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) emphasized in Post Danmark that “competition on
the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the
marginalization of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to
consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice,
quality or innovation.”65 This is to say that the showing of negative (perhaps
even destructive) consequences to rivals does not make exclusion automati-
(1956); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1959); with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977);
United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“The rule of reason
requires the fact-finder to weigh all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.
The plaintiff bears an initial burden under the rule of reason of showing that the alleged combi-
nation or agreement produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within the relevant product and
geographic markets.”); Herbert J Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust, 2001 COLUMBIA BUS.
REV. 257 (2001); Herbert J Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. LAW REV.
213 (1985).
59. But see Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Re-
cent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPET. POL’Y INT. 58 (2007).
60. Tirole, as early as 1988, stated that “few topics in industrial organization are as
controversial as market foreclosure.” TIROLE, supra note 34, at 193.
61. James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT.
J. IND. ORG. 639 (2005).
62. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Guidance on the Com-
mission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, para 75; Case T-201-04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007]
ECR II-3601, ¶¶ 319, 330-36.
63. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 111–12.
64. Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir.
1986).
65. Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencera˚det, 2012 EU:C:2012:172.
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cally anticompetitive. Anticompetitive conduct is conduct that “unnecessa-
rily excludes or handicaps competitors,”66 meaning that it impairs
competition (not simply individual competitors) without benefiting consum-
ers or promoting progress and innovation.67
It should also be noted that exclusionary practices are an expression of
firms’ freedom to choose their partners as they sit fit.68 This freedom is
clearly limited, but it does underscore what the starting point and the norm
is: firms are free to decide the terms and conditions of dealing with competi-
tors (or market players in general) as long as this is not the result of abuse of
dominance, monopolization or attempt to monopolize, and it does not
threaten the competitive process. As the Court noted in Verizon, courts
“have been very cautious in recognizing [. . .] exceptions [to the freedom to
deal], because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of
identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.”69
2. The Elements of Anticompetitive Exclusion
The above-mentioned principles suggest a need for a framework to
parse out exclusion that forms part of regular economic life from exclusion
that unfairly disadvantages competition (the meaning of unfairly is itself up
for courts and regulators to decide). While not a straightforward exercise,
there is now a long line of scholarship and practice that has managed to
distill, with some deviations, the essential elements of anticompetitive exclu-
sion. These are the ability and power to exclude, the abuse/exploitation of
that power (i.e. the “bad conduct”), and the resulting competitive harm.70
These factors are predominantly associated with antitrust, but they are also
66. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985).
67. See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care Services v. Radford Community Hospital, 910
F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990). This does not mean that business conduct that falls short of this
threshold cannot produce a certain measure of anticompetitive effects. However, due to the
limitations of antitrust enforcement, including resources, time it takes to reach a verdict, type
and effectiveness of remedies, and due to the general deference to the efficiency of the market
and the (often under-appreciated) innovation externalities of business practices, antitrust law
by and large pursues only behavior that goes beyond the inconveniencing of individual com-
petitors, affects a significant line of commerce, and is not just a temporary spike in competitive
pressure in the market.
68. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Guidance on the Com-
mission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, para 75; Case T-201-04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007]
ECR II-3601, ¶¶ 319, 330-336.
69. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
70. See Grason Elec. Co v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1512. See
also HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 295–301; SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31, at
111–118. Cf. also U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, ¶ 4.1.2 (2010).
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relevant to regulation.71 Because the doctrine of exclusion did not develop
overnight or derive from a single source, the framework is not as structured
as one would expect. Some commentators, for example, factor in efficiencies
in the assessment of the element of abuse, while others consider it a separate
parameter;72 or for certain practices the showing of competitive harm may
not always be necessary (e.g. exclusive long-term dealing without obvious
justifications), although these cases are now rare exceptions. But by and
large, the elements identified above are essential in all models.
As a general matter, the first factor determines the potential for anticom-
petitive exclusionary conduct in the market. It is not enough that one or
more competitors or complements will be foreclosed from the market; what
matters is whether enough competitors or complements will be foreclosed
that the institutional process of competition will be impaired.73 This is a
direct outgrowth of the fact that the goal of antitrust and sectoral regulation
is the safeguarding of effective competition in the market, not the protection
of individual competitors, and of the principle that firms are free to choose
their partners and strategy in the market, which will necessarily result in
some exclusion.74
The ability to engage in exclusionary practices that can affect competi-
tive conditions is a confluence of both supply and demand considerations.
On the supply side, if enough rivals remain in the market or can exert com-
71. For example, the FCC in the Open Internet Order takes into account broadband
providers’ ability to foreclose competing services, the lack of legitimate reasons to do so, and
the harmful effects on the health of the Internet ecosystem. See Open Internet Order, supra
note 23 ¶¶ 78-103. See also Christopher Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Net Neu-
trality Debate, 1 INT. J. COMMUN. 493 (2007); Philip Weiser, Towards a Next Generation
Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO LAW J. 41 (2003). Damien Geradin & J
Gregory Sidak, European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institu-
tional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications, Handbook of Telecommunications Eco-
nomics: Technology Evolution and the Internet: Volume 2 517 (Sumit Majumdar, Ingo
Vogelsang, & Martin Cave eds., 2005) (concluding that that the prophylactic approach of
regulatory authorities considers “the probability of anticompetitive behavior in the absence of
the prior restraint. . . the magnitude of the harm from such behavior. . . the likelihood and
magnitude of offsetting efficiency justifications. . . and the danger of false positives,” and that
“there are interactions between antitrust and sector-specific regulations and these have to be
taken into account when addressing the issue of remedies.”
72. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31 at 114.
73. Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[i]t is competition, not
competitors, which the Act protects.”). See also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477 (1977). The European Commission has also explicitly stated that “what really
matters is protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting competitors”
and that “the aim of the Commission’s activity in relation to exclusionary conduct is to ensure
that dominant undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing their competi-
tors in an anti-competitive way, thus having an adverse impact on consumer welfare.” Com-
munication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Art. 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertak-
ings, ¶¶ 6, 19 (2009/C 45/02).
74. SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 10-19.
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petitive pressure, e.g. by threat of entry, expansion of output or by other
means, then exclusion is less likely to impair the process of competition.75
Similarly, the easier it is for demand-side actors to access rival products and
services the less effective the exclusionary conduct is and therefore the less
harmful.76
Moreover, it is not enough that the demand and supply conditions con-
ducive to hindering competition occur only momentarily in the industry’s
lifetime. Transient market power that allows a firm to temporarily exclude
its rivals is usually not capable of causing harm to competition (perhaps only
to individual competitors). Whatever the effects of exclusion, judicial or reg-
ulatory response is not normally warranted unless the practice and effects of
exclusion have persisted or can persist in time.77 This is good practice be-
cause both judicial and regulatory measures have a (quasi-)permanent effect
and come with a cost, and therefore they are likely to be an appropriate and
proportionate response only when exclusion’s effect is also expected to be a
lasting one.78 This is particularly important in digital markets because of the
frequently cited dynamic nature of the industry (an assumption that we test
in this Article).79
Moving on, it is also important to establish that the exclusionary effect
is the result of abuse of market power, rather than legitimate exercise of it. It
is well established that the possession and exercise of market power is not
punishable in itself; only the abuse thereof.80 Most recently the Court in
Verizon noted that “the mere possession of monopoly power, and the con-
comitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
75. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895, 904 (1997) (“Un-
rebutted evidence that actual competitors have entered the market is a strong indicator that [the
defendant] lacks market power.”); R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris, 199 F. Supp.
2D 362, 383 (“[a] mere showing of substantial or even dominant market share alone cannot
establish market power sufficient to carry out [an anticompetitive pricing] scheme. The plain-
tiff must show that new rivals are barred from entering the market and show that existing
competitors lack the capacity to expand their output to challenge the [defendant’s] high
price.”); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 et al. v. Hyde 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See contra the heavily criticized case
Brown Shoe, supra note 73. See also Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Art. 82, supra note 68, ¶ 30, where the European Commission stresses that “where
there is no residual competition and no foreseeable threat of entry, the protection of rivalry and
the competitive process outweighs possible efficiency gains.”
76. CARLTON AND PERLOFF, supra note 35 at 612. KATERINA MANIADAKI, EU COMPETI-
TION LAW, REGULATION AND THE INTERNET: THE CASE OF NET NEUTRALITY 168–81 (2014).
77. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (where the Court was
convinced of Lorain Journal’s monopoly position not only because of its high market share but
also because it had persisted for more than 15 years at the time the case made it to trial).
78. See infra Part 5.
79. See infra Parts 5.1 and 5.2.
80. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 31 S.Ct. 502, 516 (1911); United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1704 (1966).
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important element of the free market system.”81 This should not be read to
mean that dominant firms are completely unrestrained to conduct themselves
as they wish, but that tolerating power and the legitimate exercise thereof is
an integral part of market organization.82 Therefore, to the extent that there
are legitimate justifications for exclusionary behavior even of dominant
firms, the case for antitrust or regulatory action is weakened.
Anticompetitive effect should also be demonstrated.83 Antitrust practice
has moved away from the per se treatment of exclusion, making the showing
of competitive harm essential, and regulatory practice also requires showing
of persistent and extensive anticompetitive effects as a condition to enact
measures.84 The showing of effects is a factual matter, which does not con-
cern the conduct itself, but rather the condition in which the conduct leaves
consumers and the market. As such, it remains unaffected by technological
parameters the way they are understood here, and therefore falls outside the
scope of this Article.
Building upon this framework, the analysis that follows will focus on
certain aspects that differentiate digital markets from traditional markets,
highlighting the special characteristics that inform and affect the appropriate
treatment of exclusion. Along those lines, the ability to engage in anticompe-
titive exclusion comes first, with a discussion on the effects of the technol-
ogy-intensive nature of digital markets on competition, substitution, and
consumer choice (the supply and demand factors). The article then moves on
to the issue of market evolution and market power persistence, which holds a
more pronounced role in dynamic industries and therefore deserves separate
consideration. The question of how to construe the element of “anticompeti-
tiveness” in assessing firm conduct concludes the analysis.
II. ABILITY TO EXCLUDE: SUPPLY SIDE CONSIDERATIONS
Supply side considerations measure the response of competitors to a cer-
tain (potentially anticompetitive) action.85 The idea is that the exclusionary
power of an actor is limited by the response of other market players, and
therefore firm conduct is unlikely to be harmful to competition if market
actors act to contain it. This is true both for ex ante regulation and for ex
post antitrust enforcement, because in both cases the competitive response
will have either a dissuasive or suppressive effect or both.
Assume, for instance, a downstream firm excludes an upstream input
with the goal to deny it of a distribution channel. This strategy cannot be
successful if the downstream firm’s rivals are ready to offer a distribution
81. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407.
82. SULLIVAN, GRIMES & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 81–83.
83. Potential efficiencies that offset the negative effects of exclusionary conduct are
usually factored in here to calculate the net effect of the conduct under scrutiny.
84. See infra Part 6.
85. HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 121–23.
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channel to the input, or if the input provider expands into the downstream
market itself.86 The opposite can also be true where a downstream firm
blocks access to a (necessary, superior, or cost-saving) input,87 but rivals
switch to the production of the input, or entrants join the input market, and
make it available downstream.88
Correctly identifying the sources of competitive pressure firms are sub-
ject to is probably the most important parameter in the assessment of exclu-
sion because it in turn determines how likely and extensive the effect of
exclusion will be on the market. Authorities and courts have come a long
way in identifying sources of competition but a lot is left to be desired.
Initially, direct existing competitors were considered the main source of
pressure.89 Over the years, potential entrants or existing market players who
switch production to make up for the exclusionary restrictions were also
included.90 For example, in the landmark Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. case,
where the issue was whether IBM monopolized the market for “plug-com-
patible” peripherals, the circuit court did not just consider competition from
producers of plug-compatible peripherals (direct competitors), but also from
those of non-compatible peripherals who could switch to producing compati-
ble peripherals, or who could use cheap adaptors to make non-compatible
peripherals compatible.91
The expansion is welcome as it attempts to more fully capture the com-
petitive constraints firms are subject to. But the way this expansion has been
applied in digital markets is incomplete and selective. It is so because,
firstly, it underrates entry potentials, particularly from firms that are present
in one layer of the value chain and expand vertically into another; secondly,
because it overlooks the technological potential for reorganization of the
86. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 32, at 254.
87. This in turn presupposes that the input supplier has an interest in partnering only
with the exclusionary downstream firm, and for this to be profitable for the input supplier that
downstream firm must possess a rather large market share. See Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew
N. Kleit, Exclusion, Collusion, and Confusion: The Limits of Raising Rivals’ Costs, 8014,
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Working Paper No. 179, 1990). See also Thomas Krattenmaker &
Steven Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L. J., 1987 at 71. This prob-
lem disappears if the upstream and downstream firms integrate.
88. See Coate & Kleit, supra note 87.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425-27 (2d Cir.
1945).
90. Jonathan Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation
of the Hospital Industry, 51 L. CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988 at 93, 101–02 (where the author
pinpoints the mid-70s as the time courts started considering potential rather than direct existing
competitors too, and provides relevant case-law). Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, ¶¶ 5.1-.2, 9, https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (where it is proposed that the re-
sponse by competitors should be assessed inter alia based on timeliness, likelihood and
sufficiency).
91. Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 919 (10th Cir. 1975). See
also Europemballage Corp. & Cont’l Can Inc. v. Comm’n, 1973 E.C.R. 215, at 225.
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value chain; and thirdly, because it underestimates vertical shifts in power
balance. All three can lead to an inaccurate assessment of competitive condi-
tions. For too long, competition analysis has focused on horizontal relation-
ships because these are traditionally seen to denote substitutes, whereas
vertical relationships are thought to denote complements.92 But if the es-
sence of competition analysis is to determine the plausibility and/or extent of
harm based on market power and abuse thereof, then any force that can
counter firms’ efforts and ability to exclude their rivals from the market
should be accounted for regardless of position in the market.93 Indeed, as
Porter has stated:
[T]he theory of entry barriers has been limited unnecessarily by
confining itself to the movement of firms from zero outputs to posi-
tive outputs. It becomes much richer—yet remains determinate—
when set forth as a general theory of the mobility of firms among
segments of an industry, thus encompassing exit and inter-group
shifts as well as entry.94
This is particularly important in the context of digital markets: as will be
shown below, digital markets are characterized by the facilitation of vertical
mobility and entry, the multiplication of sources of competitive pressure in
the absence of entry, and the increased potential for relocation of functional-
ity (and therefore substitutability) along the value chain. The combined ef-
fect of these features should inform the analysis of anticompetitive exclusion
in digital markets, which, however, is not always the case.
For example, it is arguable that the recent Open Internet regulations both
in the US and the EU, which enacted general ex ante bans on blocking,
throttling, and discrimination for fear that broadband providers would fore-
closure competing services from the market, did not sufficiently account for
the competitive pressure broadband providers are subject to from actors in
other parts of the value chain, including over the top (OTT) service provid-
92. See Robert L. Steiner, Vertical Competition, Horizontal Competition, and Market
Power, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 251, 251–53 (2008). See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal
Trade Comm’n, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines ¶ 4.0 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/05/18/2614.pdf (“By definition, nonhorizontal mergers in-
volve firms that do not operate in the same market.”).
93. Steiner, supra note 92; See also Ioannis Lianos, The Vertical/Horizontal Dichotomy
in Competition Law: Some Reflections with Regard to Dual Distribution and Private Labels, in
PRIVATE LABELS, BRANDS AND COMPETITION POLICY 161 (Ariel Ezrachi & Ulf Bernitz eds.,
2009); MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUS-
TRIES AND COMPETITORS 3–5 (2004); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM:
THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (2nd ed. 1993); JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE
POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 50–51 (1968).
94. Richard Caves & Michael Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Con-
jectural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q. J. ECON. 241, 241
(1977).
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ers, content providers, alternative IP-based network infrastructure providers,
or the ever-expanding list of modalities of Internet access.95 As a result, the
ability and incentives of broadband providers to foreclose competition may
have been exaggerated. While a fuller account of the competitive conditions
would likely not eliminate the need for regulatory action, it is possible that
regulators would opt for milder alternatives. A good example is the general-
purpose clause suggested (but eventually rejected) in FCC’s NPRM of Feb-
ruary 2014, which, instead of a general ban “would prohibit as commercially
unreasonable those broadband providers’ practices that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, threaten to harm Internet openness and all that it pro-
tects” (emphasis added).96 An application of the technology-informed frame-
work presented herein would suggest that the NPRM regime is more
appropriate.
The Microsoft Internet Explorer cases in the US and the EU are also an
example of miscalculation of the competitive conditions in the market. In
said cases, Microsoft was required to give consumers the choice of Internet
browser, after it was found that Microsoft’s Internet Explorer was dominant,
and that IE’s tying to Windows had the potential to foreclose competition in
the browser market.97 The only path to reaching this conclusion, especially
at the time the EU case was handled, was through overestimating entry barri-
ers, through ignoring the direction of the market’s evolution and IE’s stead-
ily declining market share, through ill-defining substitutability to exclude
competition from phone and (the then upcoming) tablet browsers, and
through exaggerating the potential harm to operating system competitors and
application developers.98 We can safely see today that none of the relevant
concerns ever materialized, and the browser market was highly competitive
already around the end of the Microsoft litigation and shortly thereafter,
which implies that the antitrust commitments were not instrumental.99 What
95. Open Internet Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 78-85; See also BODY OF EUROPEAN REGU-
LATORS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, AN ASSESSMENT OF IP INTERCONNECTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF NET NEUTRALITY 9-15 (2012). See also Konstantinos Stylianou, The Persistent
Problems of Net Neutrality or Why Are We Still Lacking Stable Net Neutrality Regulation, in
NET NEUTRALITY COMPENDIUM 211, 221–22 (Luca Belli & Primavera De Filippi eds.) (2016).
96. At the same time, it could permit “broadband providers to serve customers and carry
traffic on an individually negotiated basis, ‘without having to hold themselves out to serve all
comers indiscriminately on the same or standardized terms,’ so long as such conduct is com-
mercially reasonable.” See Open Internet Order, supra note 23, ¶ 116.
97. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002); Case COMP/C-3/
39.530 Microsoft, Commission Decision of 16 Dec. 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/com
petition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39530/39530_2671_3.pdf.
98. Lopatka & Page, supra note 8, at 211–29.
99. But see COATES, supra note 15, at 267, who concludes that Microsoft’s continuing
high market share in both the operating system and the Internet browser market is an indica-
tion that persistent monopolies even high technology dynamic markets are likely. Coates
seems to be focusing on static market shares and not the fact that they were (and still are)
steadily declining, but he also seems to assume that the original harms associated with the
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is even more interesting, is that four years later the European Commission
fined Microsoft for non-compliance to its decision, thusly re-validating the
perceived relevance of the original decision in a competitive environment
that was even more removed from any conditions that would warrant a find-
ing of potential foreclosure.
Against the backdrop of examples like the above, but also newer cases
like the Google Android investigation in the U.S. and the EU, which re-
volves around the potential exclusion of operating system and application
manufacturers, it becomes imperative to ensure that due consideration is
given to all factors that feed into the assessment of the anticompetitive threat
of exclusion in digital markets. As mentioned, when it comes to the supply
side of the ability to exclude, the focus will be on three areas: entry poten-
tials, particularly from firms that are present in one layer of the value chain
and expand vertically into another; the technological potential for reorgani-
zation of the value chain; and vertical shifts in power balance.
A. Technological Proximity and Facilitation of
Vertical Mobility and Entry
Entry expresses the situation (or possibility) whereby new firms join the
market with the potential effect of undercutting the exclusionary impact.100
In a way, entry is even more important than existing competition because it
is forward-looking and therefore reflects the conditions of the market when
the decision of a regulatory or competition authority will materialize. For
example, in the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft, recently approved by the
FTC and the European Commission, it was noted that while Skype has been,
and continues to be, the most popular service of its kind, barriers to entry are
low, numerous high quality alternatives have appeared recently and are
likely to appear in the future, and switching is easy.101 This implies that even
if the market is dominated by a single player, their dominance is not stable if
market conditions are conducive to threat by competitors, existing or poten-
tial. In Skype’s case, the threat came not only from direct horizontal compet-
itors to Skype on the Windows platform, but also from other platform
acquisition and maintenance of the monopoly position through anticompetitive practices con-
tinue to materialize. If this assumption does not hold, then neither the monopoly position nor
the associated practices should concern us. And indeed, it is rather doubtful that competition or
consumers were harmed by IE’s or WMP’s tying in the post 2010 era. Netscape and Real-
Player may have been eclipsed, but the market for browsers and media players was and is
highly competitive, and therefore, while individual competitors were harmed, the process of
competition was not.
100. SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 69–71.
101. See Early Termination Notice 20110881: Microsoft Corp. – Skype Global S.a.r.l.,
FTC (June 16, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-
termination-notices/20110881; Case COMP/M.6281-Microsoft/Skype Regulation (EC) No
1392004 Merger Procedure at 14 et seq. (July 10, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/com
petition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf.
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substitutes. As the European Commission noted, “there is an increasing
trend of consumers using smartphones and tablets instead of PCs. This de-
velopment limits the effects of any foreclosure strategy by the parties which
provide services predominantly based on Windows PCs.”102
The value of entry as a factor in the assessment of exclusion lies in its
extent, likelihood and credibility, which are closely tied to industry charac-
teristics.103 If there are factors that make an industry particularly prone to
easy, credible entry, then these should be accounted for in the assessment of
exclusionary practices. The technology policy literature, which has remained
underused in antitrust and regulatory theory and practice, offers valuable
insights into how the technology-intensive nature of digital markets facili-
tates entry and mobility, thereby making the supply side more responsive to
exclusionary practices. The enhanced entry and mobility conditions either
weaken the effects of exclusion due to another competitor joining the market
or act in a dissuasive manner to prevent exclusion from taking place in the
first place.
In the classic static view of a value chain, the various layers that make it
up are thought to have been assigned distinct roles, and the final product or
service is the result of the cumulative contributions of all layers. This under-
standing implies that, although the layers are working together, they are sep-
arate and each is confined to its own respective area of activity. For instance,
in the mobile communications value chain, software developers contribute
applications, hardware manufacturers contribute devices, network providers
contribute connectivity, and so on.
However, there is nothing that axiomatically locks firms in a single
layer. In fact, it is rather intuitive that, given the opportunity and provided
that it makes business sense, a firm will enter adjacent layers. In this context,
firms that used to serve as complements to other levels of the value chain
can transcend their boundaries and enter into a competing relationship with
their once complements.104 Vertical mobility of this kind adds to the supply
side pressure the same way direct horizontal entry would occur to fill in
whatever the excluding firm deprived the market of. Evidence of this trend is
plentiful as there are numerous examples of digital firms that expanded
broadly and rapidly into markets adjacent to those they originated in; for
example, all of the big five Internet companies (Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
Google, Microsoft) started from one market and have very rapidly expanded
102. Case COMP/M.6281–Microsoft/Skype, supra note 101, at 28.
103. For a summary of these conditions see Lazaroff, supra note 8, at 22–28. For a
discussion on the industry-specific characteristics see Steven Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry,
31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551 (1986).
104. See Timothy Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, Technological Competition and the
Structure of the Computer Industry, 47 J. IND. ECON. 1, 37–38 (1999).
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to approximately 10–15 adjacent markets in a matter of only a few years, an
unprecedented occurrence in traditional industries.105
Technology-driven industries are particularly prone to the kind of verti-
cal mobility described here, allowing for a greater possibility that exclusion-
ary effects will be contained, if needed. They facilitate and encourage
vertical expansion because, as Bresnahan and Greenstein have persuasively
argued, the technological interdependence of firms along the value chain (in
the sense that the design of one layer is often affected by the design of
another layer) and the ability of firms to accumulate technical knowledge
from their surroundings enable them to more easily cross over to neighbor-
ing layers upstream or downstream:
Technically, there are no given and exogenous boundaries between
the layers. The functions now performed by one platform compo-
nent might instead be performed by another. Both software and
hardware have shown this malleability. The firms supplying key
components of the same platform often have broadly similar techni-
cal capabilities. Each would be capable of taking over the other’s
position.106
This process is not automatic and there are entry barriers like in any
other industry, including the fact that established platforms and technologies
can be hard to dislodge because they are linked to significant investments, a
well-developed customer base, and often lock-in effects.107 But in technical
industries where specialized knowledge, skills, and know-how are consid-
ered core competences, and are relevant in more than one layer, adjacent
firms are already well-equipped (or at least better equipped compared to new
entrants) to expand.108 It is harder to find this element in more traditional
industries, where every layer is characterized by different attributes. For in-
stance, in the property industry, the construction layer is markedly different
from its adjacent real estate services layer, a situation which is less pro-
nounced in digital markets where for example, the operating system layer is
not all that removed from the applications layer.
105. See infra Table 1 & accompanying notes 117-24.
106. Timothy Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND
THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155 (Jeffrey Eisenach
& Thomas L. Lenard eds., 1999).
107. See JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE 45–83 (2007) (conclud-
ing that a platform or technology incurs significant endogenous sunk costs on the basis of
irreversibility, specificity, unlimited efficacy, and (near-) unanimity about efficacy). See also
STANLEY M. BESEN & GARTH SALONER, Compatibility Standards and the Market for Telecom-
munications Services, in CHANGING THE RULES: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION, AND REGULATION IN COMMUNICATIONS 194–99 (Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth
Flamm eds., 1989).
108. See Macher & Mowery, supra note 11.
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As a result, over time, firms in high technology markets can eventually
amass the necessary knowledge and capital, “attain sufficient capabilities to
attract a larger network of suppliers and support. . . [and] grow strong
enough to move into an old platform’s market.”109 Cohen and Levinthal de-
scribe a similar process, which they call absorptive capacity.110 The absorp-
tive capacity of firms increases with their familiarity with the new
knowledge they acquire from another firm, and so the closer the firms are in
terms of prior knowledge and activities the easier it is for them to cooperate
or compete.111
What makes this type of vertical transcendence even more likely, easy,
and effective is that high technology firms oftentimes find vertical expansion
necessary in order to correctly delineate their technical boundaries. This cre-
ates strong incentives for vertical expansion and increases competitive pres-
sure in the market. Traditional industrial organization thinking associates the
boundaries of the firm with economic and managerial or organizational con-
siderations. The transaction costs theory places the natural boundaries of the
firm around those activities that are cheaper to produce or perform internally
than procure from the open market,112 while managerial and organizational
control theories revolve around the idea that the insular nature of the firm
enhances internal cohesion, coordination and control, and so activities that
are closely linked together should be brought under the same roof.113
109. Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 104, at 20–21.
110. See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspec-
tive on Learning and Innovation, 35 ADM. SCI. Q. 128, 128 (1990). See also Joris Knoben &
Leo A.G. Oerlemans, Proximity and Inter-Organizational Collaboration: A Literature Review,
8 INT. J. MANAG. REV. 71, 77–78 (2006).
111. See Cohen & Levinthal, supra note 110, at 130–31.
112. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 397 (1937); Steven N.S.
Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. LAW ECON. 1 (1983); See Oliver E Wil-
liamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 112, 112–14 (1971).
113. See David J. Teece et al., Understanding Corporate Coherence, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV.
ORGAN. 1, 18–19 (1994); PAVEL PELIKAN, Can the Innovation System of Capitalism Be Out-
performed, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 370 (Giovanni Dosi et al. eds.,
1988); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Ap-
propriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW ECON. 297 (1978); Id. at
794 (describing the essence of the firm as a contractual structure with: 1) joint input produc-
tion, 2) several input owners, 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint
inputs, 4) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with
other input owners, 5) who holds the residual claim, 6) who has the right to sell his central
contractual residual status); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative
Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383 (1992) (quoting “Firms exist
because they provide a social community of voluntaristic action structured by organizing prin-
ciples that are not reducible to individuals,” at 384); MORRIS SILVER, ENTERPRISE AND THE
SCOPE OF THE FIRM: THE ROLE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 17 (1984) (“[The entrepreneur’s]
problem is that he cannot, at reasonable cost, convey his implausible ‘secret’ to those with the
technical capabilities needed to produce the required operations at the lowest cost”); EDITH
TILTON PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1995).
206 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 24:181
For high-technology firms there is a third aspect, which indicates that, as
a matter of technical sense, functions and components that are closely inter-
twined should be grouped together in the same module.114 The idea is that
interactions within modules are more efficient than interactions between
modules, because external-to-the-module interactions impose an overhead
cost to the completion of an operation, and therefore they should be limited.
When all functions that exhibit high interdependencies are grouped in appro-
priately defined modules the system performs optimally.
Importantly for our purposes here, modules do not have to remain static.
As technical realities change, the functions performed by modules can be
rearranged, or removed completely, or new functions can be introduced into
the system to accommodate new functionality that is dictated by the princi-
ples of efficiency and progress.115 In the process, modules that were thought
to fall exclusively under one level of the value chain can expand (or shrink)
to include operations that belonged in another part.
These changes are accordingly reflected in firms’ boundaries. Firms
constantly re-evaluate their position in the mobile industry value chain and
might decide to change their boundaries to engulf (or discard) some func-
tionalities and roles because this is the most efficient scope of operation on
technical grounds.116 At any given moment, technology designers seek and
delineate their products’ and services’ “natural boundaries,”117 and, in the
process, enter new markets by internalizing the production of resources that
they used to procure as external complements.  This brings used-to-be com-
plements into a competing relationship with the newly enlarged firms. Under
these circumstances, should a firm exclude a complement or distribution
channel from the market, the competitive response may not only come from
its direct horizontal competitors, but also from firms that will expand up-
stream or downstream to fill in for the excluded complement, or create an
alternative distribution channel, if doing so can be technically efficient.
There are indeed several examples of firms that originated in one layer
in the value chain and expanded vertically with great success and in only a
114. See CARLISS YOUNG BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, Design Rules: The Power of
Modularity 64, 70 (2000); See also CARLISS BALDWIN & KIM CLARK, Modularity in the De-
sign of Complex Engineering Systems, in COMPLEX ENGINEERED SYSTEMS SE-9 175 (Dan
Braha, Ali A Minai, & Yaneer Bar-Yam eds., 2006); Herbert A Simon, The Architecture of
Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHILOS. SOC. 467, 474–77 (1962); Ron Sanchez & Joseph T.
Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in Product and Organization
Design, 17 STRATEG. MANAG. J. 63, 65 (1996).
115. BALDWIN & CLARK, MODULARITY IN THE DESIGN OF COMPLEX ENGINEERING SYS-
TEMS at 156, 180.
116. Kevin Boudreau, The Boundaries of the Platform: Vertical Integration and Eco-
nomics Incentives in Mobile Computing, at 2-3 (MIT Sloan Working Paper, 2006); Annabelle
Gawer & Rebecca M. Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary
Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. MANAG. STRATEG. 1, 3–6 (2007).
117. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 114, at 64 (speaking of a “natural division” between
parts in modular systems).
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matter of few years. Table 1 shows the markets the big five digital compa-
nies (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft) have expanded into
over the years. It is striking, not only that they are present in multiple mar-
kets, but also that they expanded to them rapidly. Amazon, Facebook and
Google have been in existence for twenty years or fewer, and in this time,
they expanded into more than ten markets each (the table only shows major
markets).
 Amazon Apple Facebook Google Microsoft 
Advertising platform • (2002)  • (2009/2012) • (2003) • (2006) 
AI assistant app • (2015) • (2014) • (2017) • (2016) • (2014) 
AI assistant devices • (2015)   • (2016)  
AI infrastructure • (2015)   • (2015)  
App store • (2011) • (2008) • (2007) • (2008) • (2009/2010) 
Browser • (2011) • (2003)  • (2008) • (1995) 
Cloud services (businesses) • (2006)   • (2011) • (2010) 
Cloud services (consumers) • (2011) • (2011)  • (2012) • (2007) 
Computer accessories  • (1977) • (2016) • (2014) • (1982) 
Content distribution • (1998/2007) • (2001)  • (2006/2011) • (1996) 
E-commerce • (1994)  • (2007)   
Maps  • (2012)  • (2005) • (2010) 
Messaging/chat  • (2011) • (2011) • (2005) • (1996/1999) 
Office tools  • (1979)  • (2006) • (1983) 
OS (Desktop)  • (1978/1984)  • (2011) • (1981/1985) 
OS (Mobile) • (2012) • (2007)  • (2008) • (2010) 
Payment services  • (2014) • (2015) • (2011)  
PC  • (1978)    
Physical retail • (2015) • (2001)   • (2009) 
Search (general)    • (1997) • (1998/2005) 
Search (specialized) • (1994/2002)  • (2013) • (2002) • (2009) 
Smartphones • (2014) • (2007)  • (2010/2016) • (2010) 
Social networks   • (2004) • (2010)  
Tablets • (2011) • (2010)  • (2012/2016) • (2012) 
TABLE 1: MARKETS IN WHICH AAFGM ARE PRESENT,
AND DATES OF ENTRY.
Over the years, the competitive pressure and the enhanced conditions of
competitive entry helped shape an environment where anticompetitive ex-
clusion was harder to achieve. For instance, Google’s entry into the mobile
operating system market with the open-source Android undercut Apple’s
dominance and caused it to loosen its infamous tight grip on its ecosys-
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tem.118 In a speech that went viral in mid-2013 Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO,
famously stated “I think you will see us open up more in the future,”119 and
some commentators have even suggested that Apple became more open than
Google.120 In a different context, Microsoft’s exclusionary strategies against
complements such as Java in the late 90s would not make any business sense
in the competitive environment of only a few years later with Apple’s intro-
duction of Safari, Google’s introduction of Chrome, and the popularization
of other browsers (e.g. Mozilla Firefox). Vertical expansion into the browser
market changed the competitive dynamics in the direction of aiming for
maximum compatibility and versatility—not exclusion—and indeed it is on
those features that browsers compete today. To take mobile phones as an-
other example, it used to be the case that mobile operating systems and mo-
bile phone devices were an integrated whole (iPhone/iOS, Nokia/Symbian,
Blackberry/Blackberry OS), making exclusion in the devices market both a
possibility and a concern. In the last decade, Microsoft, Google, Mozilla,
Ubuntu, and other companies that were present in neighboring markets de-
veloped competing mobile operating systems that were not tied to devices of
specific manufacturers, but were licensed (some for free) to any manufac-
turer that met their technical requirements, providing ample choice to device
manufacturers and network operators. These dynamics are found in the nas-
cent market for artificially intelligent personal assistants as well, where Am-
azon is seen as the pioneer with Amazon Echo. As expected, Amazon tied
the Echo device to its e-commerce and content delivery services (Amazon
Prime, Amazon Video, Amazon Music, etc.).121 For anyone concerned that
alternative AI personal assistants or providers of complementary/input ser-
vices to AI personal assistants would be excluded if Amazon dominated the
market, the answer came fairly quickly from Google, which, harnessing its
expertise in various related markets, introduced its own device, Google
Home. Google, in a similar fashion to Amazon, promotes its own affiliated
services through Google Home (Google Music, YouTube etc.), and com-
petes with Amazon as systems (rather than as components).122 What is inter-
esting is that Amazon, in response. decided to unbundle the AI element of
118. Michael Vakulenko, Mobile Platforms: The Clash of Ecosystems, SLASHDATA
(Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.slashdata.co/blog/2011/11/new-report-mobile-platforms-the-
clash-of-ecosystems; Justin Fox, Why Apple Has to Become More Open, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Mar. 11, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/03/why-apple-is-going-have-to-bec.html.
119. Ina Fried, Could Apple Be Getting Just a Bit More Open?, ALLTHINGSD (May 28,
2013), http://allthingsd.com/20130528/could-apple-be-getting-just-a-bit-more-open/.
120. Christopher Mims, It’s Official: Apple Is Now More ‘Open’ than Google, MIT
TECH. REV. (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/424925/its-official-apple-is-
now-more-open-than-google/.
121. See Joanna Stern, Google Home vs Amazon Echo: Which Robot Do You Let Into
Your Life?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-home-vs-ama
zon-echo-which-robot-do-you-let-into-your-life-1478544438.
122. Id.
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Amazon Echo from the device and publish its APIs, so that application de-
velopers and device manufacturers can use it.123 This opens up the technol-
ogy to market players that are unaffiliated with Amazon, further removing
fears of effective exclusionary practices in the face of systems competition
with Google. Apple is also expected to use its expertise in AI personal as-
sistants to introduce a device like Echo and Home, a development that will
also increase substitutability.124
What derives from the exposition above is that companies exploit their
technical capabilities in one market to move up and down the value chain
with ease and speed, which was never before possible, making entry plausi-
ble and effective.125 Firms that were once confined in one layer of the value
chain and served as complements for firms in other layers can quickly and
efficiently develop expertise in other layers and a good understanding of the
end service or product, and can therefore tweak their technology to move
upstream or downstream and expand to another level too. If a firm, then,
decides to exclude inputs or foreclose distribution channels, thereby creating
unmet demand in the market, these “technologically adept” firms are waiting
in the wings to fill in.
To be sure, the ability of firms to move upstream or downstream as they
develop comparable technical expertise can harm competition for the same
reasons it can enhance it. The vertical expansion of a dominant firm in one
layer to adjacent levels of production is at the core of the fears surrounding
the leveraging theory of exclusion (using market power in one layer to ex-
pand power into another). This, for example, was a common concern in the
early life of Java. Java was originally developed as a middle layer between
the operating system and the software that ran on top of it. It was seen as a
platform layer distinct from that of the applications that were designed for
Java and from the underlying operating system. In this configuration Sun—
the company behind Java—was not in a competing relationship with devel-
opers of Java applications. However, the growing popularity of Java raised
fears that Sun would enter the applications layer too. As Garud et al. explain:
Such concerns were heightened by Sun’s introduction of Java prod-
ucts that competed with those offered by other members of the Java
collective. Even ardent supporters were afraid that Sun’s control
would give it undue advantage when competition intensified in the
Java product-market. Pat Sueltz, then general manager of Java
123. Taylor Martin, 7 Things Amazon Echo Can Do That Google Home Can’t, CNET
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/amazon-echo-things-alexa-can-do-that-google-
home-cant/.
124. Nick Statt, Apple Is Reportedly Building a Siri Speaker to Rival Amazon’s Echo,
THE VERGE (May 24, 2016) https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/24/11763836/apple-siri-speak
er-amazon-echo-alexa-google-home-ai.
125. See generally Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 104, at 2 (“[companies] that had
previously supplied different segments, now compete for the same customers.”).
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software at IBM, suggested: “Sun. . . should establish the standard
and compete above it. To the extent that Sun has any advantage, it
limits the creativity of their partners.”126
But the fact that vertical mobility can cut both ways does not detract
from the theory. As a matter of principle any factor that lowers barriers and
facilitates entry in the market should be welcome. The fact that technologi-
cal proximity makes entry and expansion into other markets easier and can
form a stepping stone for abuse of market power in neighboring markets is a
secondary concern that becomes valid only if market power has been accu-
mulated in the principal market in the first place.127 But, since the entry
argument applies to the principal market alike, one should welcome the en-
hanced conditions digital markets create for easier and entry.
B. Flexible Locus of Functionality
The previous section showed that the technology-intensive nature of the
digital markets creates the incentives and conditions for increased entry and
mobility, such that the pressure resulting from supply-side substitution low-
ers the plausibility of anticompetitive exclusionary effects.
This section identifies yet another source of substitution in the form of
the introduction of a new locus in the value chain, where content, services,
application, or functionality can be developed, hosted and offered from. A
new locus represents a means of providing content, services, or applications
that is new to the value chain. It does not simply result in the entry of firms
in the existing structure of the market, it rather changes the industry structure
to offer a new way of doing things. This is possible because the technical
nature of digital markets allows greater flexibility in the relocation or repli-
cation of functionality along the value chain, thereby creating competition in
new parts of the value chain and adding to the list of competitive sources
that constrain firms’ bottleneck behavior.
Probably the most well-known illustration of this feature is Java’s busi-
ness model as highlighted by its battle with Microsoft.128 Java is technically
a programming language, and its innovation lies in the “write once, run eve-
rywhere” ability, which means that once an application is developed for Java
on a given platform (e.g. the Microsoft Windows operating system) it can
run on any platform without the need to be recompiled (e.g. on a Java-ena-
bled mobile phone).129 This revolutionary feature formed an operating envi-
126. Raghu Garud, Sanjay Jain & Arub Kumaraswamy, Institutional Entrepreneurship in
the Sponsorship of Common Technological Standards: The Case of Sun Microsystems and
Java, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 196, 204 (2002).
127. See SULLIVAN, GRIMES & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 113.
128. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
129. See Java Soft Ships Java 1.01, TECH INSIDER (Jan 23, 1996), http://tech-insider.org/
java/research/1996/0123.html (“Java’s write-once-run-everywhere capability along with its
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ronment that allowed Java software to run regardless of the underlying
operating system, and, in effect, to create a new middle layer between the
operating system and the applications that ran on top of it, which broke the
link and interdependence between an operating system’s APIs and the
applications.
Microsoft vehemently fought Sun (the company behind Java) and at-
tempted to exclude it from Microsoft Windows by introducing incompatibil-
ities between Microsoft’s and Sun’s respective versions of Java Virtual
Machine.130 Microsoft was concerned that the independent evolution of Java
might mean that a new platform for applications development would
emerge, one that did not depend on Windows to run.131 Although Java was
not an operating system and hence did not compete in the same (horizontal)
market as Windows, the fear was that it could replace Windows “as the
ubiquitous platform for software development” and usurp a lot of its func-
tionality directly competing with it as a platform for software
development.132
In this situation, even if Windows wanted to exclude an application, it
could only do so when the application ran directly on Windows, not if it
could run on Java’s intermediate layer (at least not without sabotaging Java).
Potential exclusionary practices on the Windows’ side could therefore be
curtailed not because of the emergence of a new operating system, but be-
cause part of the functionality of the operating system would have migrated
elsewhere within the value chain, namely the new layer introduced by Java.
Internet browsers present another example of functionality relocation.
For the same reason that Microsoft saw Java as a threat, namely that it could
provide a new layer for applications to run on, thereby bypassing the limita-
easy accessibility have propelled the software and Internet communities to embrace it as the de
facto standard for writing applications for complex networks.”).
130. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 74-75 (“The District Court held that Microsoft engaged in
exclusionary conduct by developing and promoting its own JVM. Sun had already developed a
JVM for the Windows operating system when Microsoft began work on its version. The JVM
developed by Microsoft allows Java applications to run faster on Windows than does Sun’s
JVM, but a Java application designed to work with Microsoft’s JVM does not work with Sun’s
JVM and vice versa.” (internal citations omitted)). The claim here is not that Microsoft vio-
lated antitrust laws on the basis of its exclusionary conduct. As the court noted “[i]n order to
violate the antitrust laws, the incompatible product must have an anticompetitive effect that
outweighs any procompetitive justification for the design. Microsoft’s JVM. . . allows Java
applications to run faster on Windows. . . and does not itself have any anticompetitive effect.
Therefore, we reverse the District Court’s imposition of liability for Microsoft’s development
and promotion of its JVM.”). See also Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, supra note 126, at 204.
131. In a 1995 memo addressed to Microsoft’s executives Bill Gates wrote: “A new
competitor ‘born’ on the Internet is Netscape. Their browser is dominant, with 70% usage
share, allowing them to determine which network extensions will catch on. They are pursuing
a multi-platform strategy where they move the key API into the client to commoditize the
underlying operating system.’ Memorandum from Bill Gates to Exec. Staff (May 26, 1995)
(archived at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/03/03/20.pdf).
132. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 74.
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tions and controls of the operating system, Microsoft also saw competing
internet browsers (and mainly Netscape Navigator) as a threat to its operat-
ing system.133 Internet browsers could serve as a platform to run services on,
and they could provide functionality that up until that point fell under an
operating system’s ambit.
What is most interesting for the purposes of the analysis of exclusion
here is the substitutability potential the merging of Internet browsers and
operating systems creates. Google, for instance, recently announced An-
dromeda, an operating system that results from the merging of Chrome OS
(Google’s operating system which is based on the Chrome internet browser)
and Android (Google’s mobile operating system). Andromeda can run on
personal computers, tablets and phones, and can run applications that are
written for Android or for Chrome OS.134 The dual nature of Andromeda
allows it to operate and create competitive pressure in multiple markets and
layers. This could allow Andromeda to serve as an effective substitute to
Windows, whose traditional and most powerful advantage has been the net-
work effects around compatible applications, something that Andromeda can
counter by exploiting the popularity of the Android applications ecosystem.
Moving on, an unnoticed but far-reaching transformation of how appli-
cations, services, and products are delivered to users comes from the lower
layers of online markets, changing the dynamics of substitutability in a fun-
damental way never before seen. Until now the model for offering commu-
nication services has been based on two modalities: services that relied on
traditional telecommunications networks, including telephony, text
messages, voice mail, etc., and internet services, which include all services
accessible through the public internet (other non-internet IP networks are
available but these are normally reserved for specialized business needs and
not open to the public). The Internet is regarded as the main driving force for
innovation in products, services, and applications because of the general-
purpose nature of the IP protocol.135 To the contrary, traditional telecommu-
nications networks, which were based on a different less flexible protocol
133. Id. at 59.
134. Ron Amadeo, Android + Chrome = Andromeda: Merged OS Reportedly Coming to
the Pixel 3, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 26, 2016, 2:55 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/
09/android-chrome-andromeda-merged-os-reportedly-coming-to-the-pixel-3/.
135. Barry Leiner et al., The Past and Future History of the Internet, 40 COMM. ACM
102, 104 (1997) (“[t]he Internet was not designed for just one application but as a general
infrastructure on which new applications could be conceived”); see also David D. Clark, Inter-
operation, Open Interfaces and Protocol Architecture, in THE UNPREDICTABLE CERTAINTY:
WHITE PAPERS INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2000 133, 133–34 (NII 2000 Steer-
ing Committee, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Commission on Physical
Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications ed., 1997).
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stack called SS7, were created with a limited number of services in mind,
which were controlled by the respective network owner and operator.136
What we are beginning to see now is that communications networks are
all transitioning to IP-based technologies, which means that service and ap-
plication delivery architectures are no longer designed for a specific use or
function, but rather to support and host a variety of services, functionalities,
and applications. As a result, new communications networks can replicate
the internet model, and can allow the hosting of functionality in layers of the
value chain that were not traditionally associated with it. This new option
creates additional sources of supply and substitutability in services and ap-
plications making anticompetitive exclusion harder to establish.
There are various technologies that enable the kind of flexibility de-
scribed here. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is one popular implemen-
tation, and set the tone for the future telecom companies want to move
towards.137 IMS forms part of an overhaul that mobile communications net-
works are undergoing, called System Architecture Evolution (SAE),138 and is
a standardized architecture for the transmission of multimedia (including
voice, text messages, video) and other traffic.139 SAE/IMS, for the first time
since the commercialization of the internet, offer an alternative general-pur-
pose platform, encompassing all players along the value chain. As Siemens’
Director for Fixed-Mobile Convergence Solutions put it: “IMS is designed
to provide operators with the means to satisfy the growing demand for rich,
diverse communications services. . . For vendors and new application prov-
iders, the IMS architecture supports rapid and efficient service creation. For
users, IMS makes it possible to access multiple services in the course of the
same call or session.”140 This environment can serve as a parallel—if more
limited—platform for service, application, and content creation and delivery,
the first time this has ever happened outside of the internet context (open to
the public).
136. RAY HORAK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 182
(2007).
137. See Press Release, IHS, Service Providers Optimistic about Moving IMS Networks
to NFV, Rate Vendors (July 9, 2015), https://technology.ihs.com/545822/service-providers-
optimistic-about-moving-ims-networks-to-nfv-rate-vendors; cf. Darren McQueen, The Mo-
mentum Behind LTE Adoption, 47 IEEE COMM. MAG. 44 (2009); Alexander Harrowell, IMS:
Two Visions of the Telecoms Future, 130 MOBILE TELECOMM. INT’L 1 (2006).
138. See generally Kalyani Bogineni et al., LTE Part II: Radio Access, 47 IEEE COMM.
MAG. 40 (2009); Kalyani Bogineni Kalyani et al., LTE Part I: Core, 47 IEEE COMM. MAG. 40
(2009).
139. Antonio Cuevas et al., The IMS Service Platform: A Solution for Next-Generation
Network Operators to Be More than Bit Pipes, 44 IEEE COMM. MAG. 75, 76-77 (2006). See
also Gilles Bertrand, The IP Multimedia Subsystem in Next Generation Networks (May 30,
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
140. Felipe Alvarez del Pino & Gary Iosbaker, IMS: Application Enabler and UMTS/
HSPA Growth Catalyst, in BUSINESS MODELS AND DRIVERS FOR NEXT-GENERATION IMS SER-
VICES (International Engineering Consortium ed., 2007) (emphasis added).
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IMS is not the only emerging alternative architecture; other hybrid ar-
chitectures have appeared taking advantage of the universal and general pur-
pose nature of IP.141 Over the past few years communications applications
and services have been deployed on such architectures as infrastructure-as-a-
service (IaaS),142 platform-as-a-service,143 network-as-a-service (NaaS),144
and network virtualization.145 Bell Labs/Alcatel-Lucent has described this
general trend as follows: “It is envisaged that services and applications will
migrate to a cloud-computing paradigm where thin-clients on user devices
access, over the network, applications hosted in data centers by application
service providers.”146 These technologies provide the necessary hardware
and software to develop and deploy services and applications, which are
delivered to end users through last mile infrastructure operators. This model
is becoming increasingly popular, including among mobile virtual network
operators (MVNOs), who until recently were limited to whatever network
capabilities the host carrier supported, but can now have their own plat-
141. On the distinction between the Internet and other (potentially open) IP-based plat-
forms see Kimberly C. Claffy & David Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regu-
lation, presented at the 41st Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet
Policy (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242600 (discussing alternative
IP platforms).
142. See, e.g., TATA COMMUNICATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE AS A SERVICE: FULFILLING
THE PROMISE OF CLOUD COMPUTING (2010), http://www.tatadocomo.com/business/download/
WhitePaper-Infrastructure-as-a-Service.pdf; What is IaaS?, INTEROUTE, http://www.interoute
.com/what-iaas (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
143. Vaˆnia Gonc¸alves & Pieter Ballon, Adding Value to the Network: Mobile Operators’
Experiments with Software-as-a-Service and Platform-as-a-Service Models, 28 TELEMATICS
AND INFORMATICS 12, 12 (2011).
144. See, e.g., MARCO HOFFMANN & MARKUS STAUFER, NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION FOR
FUTURE MOBILE NETWORKS: GENERAL ARCHITECTURE AND APPLICATIONS (2011); Ashiq Khan
et al., Network Sharing in the Next Mobile Network: TCO Reduction, Management Flexibility,
and Operational Independence, 49 IEEE Comm. Mag. 134 (2011); See also Press Release,
Fujitsu Unveils ‘Network as a Service Concept,’ (May 16, 2007), http://www.fujitsu.com/
global/about/resources/news/press-releases/2007/0516-02.html.
145. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Turner & David E. Taylor, Diversifying the Internet, Applied
Research Laboratory Washington University in St. Louis, Sept. 2005, https://www.arl.wustl
.edu/Publications/2005-09/globecom05divNet.pdf; Flavio Esposito, Ibrahim Matta & Vatche
Ishakian, Slice Embedding Solutions for Distributed Service Architectures, Boston University
Computer Science Technical Reports, Feb. 5, 2011, http://www.cs.bu.edu/techreports/pdf/
2011-025-slice-embedding.pdf; Diego Lopez et al., Impact of SDN/NFV on Business Models,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Jan. 2016, https://sdn.ieee.org/newsletter/jan
uary-2016/impact-of-sdn-nfv-on-business-models.
146. Fang Hao et al., Enhancing Dynamic Cloud-based Services Using Network Virtual-
ization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST ACM WORKSHOP ON VIRTUALIZED INFRASTRUCTURE SYS-
TEMS AND ARCHITECTURES 37, 37 (2009).
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form.147 In fact, as Wi-Fi is becoming more prevalent, reliance on traditional
carriers is decreasing even further.148
Under these changing technological conditions, given the multiple op-
tions for service, application, and content development and delivery, the ef-
fect of the ability to exclude in one platform is weakened because of the
possibility to turn to other platforms. Admittedly, much of the competitive
potential described here has yet to materialize, and one should therefore be
careful not to overestimate its dissuasive and suppressive effect. However, it
is worth noting and anticipating the kind of substitutability options made
available by newer technologies, so that when they reach maturity, courts
and authorities will be ready to acknowledge them and factor them in. Any
forward-looking measure would do well to consider not only the state of the
technology but also prevailing trends. For instance, the US Court of Appeals
in the Microsoft case noted that “[a]s the record in this case indicates, six
years seems like an eternity in the computer industry. By the time a court
can assess liability, firms, products, and the marketplace are likely to have
changed dramatically. This, in turn, threatens enormous practical difficulties
for courts considering the appropriate measure of relief,” noting further,
however, that “[e]ven in those cases where forward-looking remedies appear
limited, the Government will continue to have an interest in defining the
contours of the antitrust laws so that law-abiding firms will have a clear
sense of what is permissible and what is not.”149
C. Competitive Pressure and Dissuasive Effects from Existing Actors
The kind of competitive pressure documented so far stems either from
entry into the bottleneck market where exclusionary practices are feared, or
from the relocation or replication of functionality, such that firms may find
their role and function usurped or replicated by firms that would not nor-
mally count as competitors. In either case, supply side substitution becomes
stronger.
At the same time, the ability to effectively exclude depends also on the
pressure firms are subject to from other firms along the value chain, even if
these do not enter their market or take over their role or functionality. This is
because firms do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they coexist with other firms
in the value chain, and they are all essentially vying for the same reward: a
147. Dan Meyer, NFV and SDN PoCs Continue in 2016, Greater Adoption in 2017,
RCRWIRELESSNEWS (Dec. 29, 2015). See also Doyle Lee, NFV Adoption to Transform Tele-
communications Infrastructure, GIGAOM RESEARCH (Feb. 25, 2014), http://events.windriver
.com/wrcd01/wrcm/2016/08/WP-gigaom-research-report-nfv-adoption-to-transform-telecom-
munications-infrastructure.pdf.
148. See, e.g., REPUBLIC WIRELESS, https://republicwireless.com (last visited Jan. 30,
2018); TEXTNOW WIRELESS, https://www.textnow.com/wireless (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
149. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49.
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cut from the profits the value chain can generate.150 In this context, the nec-
essary market power to exclude is not only assessed vis-a`-vis competitors,
but also complements. The strategic importance of complements in the com-
position of the final product or service that is delivered to users can influ-
ence the incentive and ability of firms to profitably exclude, and therefore
should also be considered in the assessment of exclusion. Technological
proximity and interdependence between firms in digital markets magnifies
this effect and adds to the supply side competitive pressure as shown below.
1. Shifts of Power due to Technological Proximity
Technological proximity, as explained previously, enables firms to jump
from one layer to another and, in the process, create competitive pressure
and increase supply side substitution. On top of that, technological proximity
facilitates the exchange of power between players in a way that can weaken
market power by moving the center of value along the value chain. When an
actor around whom a platform or a technology revolves loses control over
the platform or technology, their relevance and market power suffer, and
along with it the ability to enforce an exclusionary policy that harms the
platform or technology.
Systems that consist of multiple components (a common feature of digi-
tal systems), are not necessarily locked in a fixed allocation of value and
importance among their parts and components.151 The total value may re-
main the same, but the internal allocation and the actors representing each
part can change due to the “vertical competition for control of a platform
among the sellers of its various components.”152 Even in complex technical
systems which comprise several parts, components and actors, at any given
time only one or a few parts/actors of the value chain can be those that
define its general architectural shape.153 These are the ones around which the
rest of the parts will develop. As the system evolves in time, it is possible
that another part/actor will take the lead as the epicenter of the system’s
design. The system will then coagulate around that new keystone
component.
In such contexts it is often unclear which standard, platform, function or
component will become the strategically most important one, around which
value and market activity will coalesce, and it is also entirely possible that
150. This concept is well summarized in the one monopoly rent theorem. See ROBERT
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 372-74 (1978); VISCUSI,
HARRINGTON, AND VERNON, supra note 43, at 248-51.
151. See, e.g., Hemant Kumae Sabat, The Evolving Mobile Wireless Value Chain and
Market Structure, 26 TELECOMM. POLICY 505 (2002); Joe Peppard & Anna Rylander, From
Value Chain to Value Network: Insights for Mobile Operators, 24 EUR. MGMT. J. 128 (2006).
152. See Bresnahan and Greenstein, supra note 104, at 23.
153. Carliss Young Baldwin & Jason C. Woodard, The Architecture of Platforms: A
Unified View, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION, 24–25 (Annabelle Gawer ed.,
2009).
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none is actually sufficiently defined, in which case competition between and
within them for one to emerge (temporarily) victorious is inevitable.154 As
this process unfolds, the various components in a system are not only con-
strained by their counterparts in other systems, but also within the system
itself by their own complements.155
The most representative example in the literature is how IBM lost lead-
ership of the personal computer (PC) platform to Microsoft and Intel.156 In
the early 1980s IBM introduced its personal computer, which it decided to
build on a modular architecture and rely on Microsoft’s Windows for the
operating system and on Intel for the processor.157 Despite its initial success,
the fact that other vendors could use Microsoft Windows and Intel to build
their own “IBM-compatible” personal computers weakened IBM’s position
in the market.158 IBM responded (belatedly) by introducing proprietary inter-
faces and its own operating system (OS/2), but control had already shifted
from IBM to the “Wintel” duo. IBM was relegated to just another personal
computer manufacturer. This example highlights how two firms that were
not directly competing with IBM, but to the contrary were a big part of the
“personal computer platform” that IBM popularized, managed to take away
control from IBM and in doing so exposed IBM to much fiercer competition
from other manufacturers, who absent the enabling factor of the Wintel duo
might not have been able to compete effectively with IBM.
The recent Netflix–Comcast controversy provides yet another example.
The controversy was about Comcast allegedly slowing down Netflix traffic
to end users because Netflix refused to compensate Comcast for direct inter-
connection at the rate Comcast thought fair.159 The exclusionary effect
against Netflix is obvious considering how important bandwidth is in deliv-
ering video to consumers. Many analysts sided with Netflix, accusing Com-
cast of exercising its termination monopoly power to get concessions out of
154. Pieter Ballon, Platform Types and Gatekeeper Roles: The Case of the Mobile Com-
munications Industry, in THE DRUID SUMMER CONFERENCE, 4 (2009); See also Kevin
Boudreau, Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control,
56 MGMT. SCI. 1849 (2010).
155. See Joseph Farrell, Hunter K Monroe & Garth Saloner, The Vertical Organization
of Industry: Systems Competition Versus Component Competition, 7 J. ECON. MANAG.
STRATEG. 143 (1998) (where the authors compare competition between systems as a whole and
between components of systems).
156. For a relevant account see Bresnahan and Greenstein, supra note 104.
157. See generally CHARLES FERGUSON & CHARLES MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS: HOW
THE WEST CAN WIN IN A POST-IBM WORLD 7–10 (BeardBooks ed., 1993) (describing the
specifications and designs of IBM’s personal computer).
158. Burton Grad, A Personal Recollection: IBM’s Unbundling of Software and Services,
24 INST. ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEER ANNALS ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 64 (2002).
159. See Susan Crawford, The Cliff and the Slope, WIRED (Oct. 30, 2014, 07:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/jammed/.
218 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 24:181
Netflix.160 This criticism reflected the traditional view that the network oper-
ator is the bottleneck, and in the position to exercise exclusionary power.
But this account likely misrepresents the balance of power between the two
companies here: ISPs like Comcast have for years expressed their discontent
with the fact that Netflix allegedly doesn’t pay its fair share relative to the
volume it offloads into ISPs’ networks, but they only recently managed to
enter into an agreement with it.161 Interestingly, the environment in which
the Comcast-Netflix dispute arose is largely unregulated, which means that
if indeed the power balance was clearly in favor of Comcast, it should not
have been too hard for it to exercise it. To the contrary, Netflix had good
reasons to believe that it could escape charges, as it had become so valuable
to ISPs’ consumers, that it knew ISPs would not block or throttle it (in other
words, foreclose it from the market).162
In these examples, what we notice is that, because of the complementar-
ity between the layers in the value chain and, because the technical details
and specifications of the end product and service that will be delivered to
consumers are defined by different and often competing firms, power is di-
vided among them. In this co-dependent relationship it is unknown ex ante
around which part of the value chain value will concentrate,163 and in fact
there is no reason why the distribution of power must remain fixed. Precisely
because the industry is conducive to this kind of power reshuffling among
actors, the observation of market power concentration in the hands of a cer-
tain actor should not inexorably point to the conclusion of a market failure in
need of regulation, but it should rather provoke an inquiry into potential
sources of counter-balancing competitive pressure, something that at first
sight might not be immediately apparent.
The argument here is not that exclusionary power is irrelevant, but
rather that it is relative. Firms are routinely constrained not only by their
competitors but also by their partners, and the balance of power among them
can and does change. In observing—and regulating—exclusionary power,
160. See id. The FCC also said it was ready to hear complaints on the dispute. See Jon
Brodkin, Netflix, Call Your Lawyers: FCC Is Ready for Interconnection Complaints, ARS
TECHNICA, (Feb. 27, 2015, 05:35 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/
02/netflix-call-your-lawyers-fcc-is-ready-for-interconnection-complaints/.
161. See Karl Bode, No, Netflix’s New Deal With Comcast Probably Won’t Destroy The
Internet. Yet., TECHDIRT, (Feb. 24, 2014, 09:50 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20140223/07543426321/no-netflixs-new-deal-with-comcast-probably-wont-destroy-internet-
yet.shtml; Dan Raybum, Inside The Netflix/Comcast Deal and What The Media Is Getting
Very Wrong, SEEKING ALPHA, (Feb. 23, 2014); Sue Zeidler, Netflix Scrambles Future of TV
and Films, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2010, 04:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-media-sum
mit-netflix/netflix-scrambles-future-of-tv-and-films-idUSTRE6B060E20101201.
162. See Marguerite Reardon, Comcast vs. Netflix: Is This Really About Net Neutrality,
CNET (May 15, 2014, 04:00 AM) https://www.cnet.com/news/comcast-vs-netflix-is-this-real
ly-about-net-neutrality/; Matthew Ingram, Here’s Why Comcast Decided to Call a Truce with
Netflix, FORTUNE (July 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/05/comcast-truce-netflix/.
163. See Gawer & Henderson, supra note 116, at 6–11.
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one should keep in mind that close technological proximity and interdepen-
dencies may cause power to flow from one part of the value chain into an-
other, having an effect on the ability to effectively exclude.
2. The Continuous Tussle in Network Industries
Like most industries, digital markets are structured around networks of
actors who represent different interests. As these interests compete against
each other, it is hard for any one player to impose their unilateral will, exclu-
sionary or otherwise. This is a general and rather obvious observation; there
is nothing new in saying that different competing interests are represented in
a given market, and that the result of competition among them is that harm-
ful business behavior is constrained.
What does make a difference, however, is how closely these competing
interests are pitted against each other by virtue of the industry’s characteris-
tics. In traditional physical commodities markets, while we do notice the
kind of vertical competition coming from complements as explained before
(on top of direct horizontal competition), the various layers in the value
chain are usually separate in the sense that the design of products or services
in one layer is not interlocked with the design of products and services in the
other layers, even though they will have to work together to reach consum-
ers. Supermarket shelves have remained the same over the years and yet the
products sold on them and the trucks that transport those products have
changed. Building techniques and architectural trends have changed even
though real estate agencies have remained the same. The tools and machin-
ery used to construct buildings have also changed in response to the new
building techniques and architectural trends, but architects, realtors and tool
manufacturers need not agree on these changes together in order for each to
do their job.
Digital markets are different. They rely on protocols, standards, inter-
faces, and technologies that have to be commonly agreed and implemented
uniformly across all layers that are involved in the delivery of a service or
product. For example, an application will not work on an operating system if
it does not comply with the operating system’s APIs, and the introduction
of—say—a quality of service protocol necessitates a series of changes along
the value chain, because if one layer does not uphold QoS requirements the
entire service collapses.164 As a result, the design and evolution of value
164. This is the reason why IntServ and DiffServ have generally failed to solve the QoS
problem on the Internet, or why transition from IPv4 to IPv6 as well as the approval and
implementation of other critical features in the Internet’s infrastructure have been very slow.
See, e.g., Mark Handley, Why the Internet Only Just Works, 24 BT TECH. J. 119 (2006). See
also Geoff Huston, The Internet – 10 Years Later, THE ISP COLUMN (June 2008), http://www
.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10years.pdf.
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chains in digital markets is a process that involves the needs and capabilities
of multiple layers, all of which attempt to maximize their interests.165
This kind of interdependence forces market actors to work together in
the development of products and services in a way that the end product and
service is the result of a compromise or consensus,166 and not of the unilat-
eral will of one actor, unless that actor is so dominant as to be able to impose
a de facto standard or technology.167 As Greenstein notes, in highly technical
and sophisticated markets the degree of specialization and secularization is
such as to lead to “an increase in the number of firms that possess the neces-
sary technical knowledge and commercial capabilities to bring to market
some component or service of value to . . . users.”168 He calls this “absence
of unilateral bargaining” and brings it as a reason why the internet, despite
the fact that it accommodates dominant actors in every part of its value
chain, is characterized by “innovative health:”
In a network with a high degree of technical interrelatedness, there
are general gains to all parties from bringing routines into business
processes and activities, much like there are gains to adopting stan-
dards and platforms to coordinate activities. While there may be no
better way to reduce complexity, adopting such routines may re-
quire negotiation between multiple parties.169
An example that beautifully illustrates this point is the “openness” con-
dition in the C Block of the 700 MHz spectrum that was auctioned in 2008.
In that auction, on the insistence of major companies like Google and the
Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, the FCC included a term requiring the
licensee to provide open platforms for devices and applications, if the win-
165. See MARTIN FRANSMAN, THE NEW ICT ECOCYSTEM 9–10 (Cambridge Univ. Press
ed., 2010) (“the four layers [networked elements, network operators, content and applications,
consumers] of the system, although hierarchically structured, are interdependent. Each layer
depends on the layer (or layers) adjacent to it. For the system as a whole to operate, each layer
needs to do its own functional job.”). See also Peppard & Rylander, supra note 151 (examin-
ing the evolution of actors in the mobile industry).
166. Cf. OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY viii–ix
(Laura DeNardis ed., 2011) (where the author explains how complex the standard-setting pro-
cess is because of the different and competing priorities players bring to the table: “technical
standards not only provide technological interoperability but also produce significant political
and economic externalities. Battles over standards are sometimes market conflicts between
technology companies. . .. [S]tandards are also political, making decisions about individual
civil liberties online.”).
167. See BESEN & SALONER, supra note 107, at 181–82.
168. Shane Greenstein, Innovative Conduct in Computing and Internet Markets, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION VOLUME I 477, 492 (Bronwyn H. Hall &
Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010).
169. Shane Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial In-
ternet, 8 J. TELECOMM. HIGH TECH. L. 25, 63 (2010).
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ning offer exceeded $4.6 billion.170 If the offer did not exceed that price, the
block would be re-auctioned without the openness requirement. Google was
one of the most ardent supporters of this condition, because as a service (and
later device) provider, it would benefit from end users being able to use its
products and services freely without any limitations from the carriers.
Google openly declared to the FCC that if and only if an openness require-
ment is included will it bid at the auction.171 At the time, Google was not
seriously considering becoming an infrastructure provider, and in any case it
knew that other companies needed and were willing to pay more for that part
of the spectrum.172 Indeed, Google bid just over the threshold price to make
sure that the openness condition would be triggered, but not high enough to
actually win the auction (Verizon, which won the C block, paid a total of
$9.6 billion for licenses included in the C block).173
The outcome of this power play was that Verizon committed to a non-
exclusion policy at least for a part of its network, even though it initially
opposed this term.174 The conditions of openness that accompanied the 700
MHz C block were not activated because Verizon caved to competitive pres-
sure by one of its direct competitors or some other player in the value chain.
170. In the Matter of Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands,
22 FCC Rcd. 15258 et seq. (2007) (Second Report and Order). (“[W]e will require only C
Block licensees to allow customers, device manufacturers, third-party application developers,
and others to use or develop the devices and applications of their choosing in C Block net-
works, so long as they meet all applicable regulatory requirements and comply with reasonable
conditions related to management of the wireless network (i.e., do not cause harm to the net-
work). Specifically, a C Block licensee may not block, degrade, or interfere with the ability of
end users to download and utilize applications of their choosing on the licensee’s C Block
network, subject to reasonable network management,” at 15365).
171. Eric Bangeman, Google Announces Intent to Bid on 700MHz Spectrum Auction,
If. . ., ARS TECHNICA (July 20, 2007), https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/07/google-
announces-intent-to-bid-on-700mhz-spectrum-auction-if/.
172. Glen Chapman, Verizon, AT&T Win FCC Auction, Google Wins Open Spectrum,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/world/verizon-att-win-
fcc-auction-google-wins-open-spectrum-20080321-20vv.html.
173. See generally Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx, The “Google
Effect” in the FCC’s 700 MHz Auction, 21 Inf. Econ. Policy 101 (2009); Saul Hansell, Ver-
izon and AT&T Win Big in Auction of Spectrum, N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www
.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/technology/21auction.html.
174. See In the Matter of Service Rules, supra note 170, at 15360 et seq. (Verizon Wire-
less argues that imposing an open access business model undermines the auction process and
competitive bidding. . . . Verizon Wireless asserts that imposing open access regulations runs
contrary to the Commission’s “light regulatory touch” for wireless services generally. . .. Ac-
cording to Verizon Wireless, requiring winners of licenses in the 22 MHz block to provide
open access would impose an asymmetrical regulatory regime on only one segment of the
industry, thus drawing arbitrary distinctions. . . . Also, according to Verizon Wireless, the
Commission cannot impose access requirements without violating various sections of the
Communications Act and affecting the First Amendment rights of existing providers” (internal
citations omitted)); See Om Malik, Verizon Sues, Google Expresses Dismay Over 700 MHz
Auction, GIGAOM (Sept. 13, 2007), https://gigaom.com/2007/09/13/verizon-sues-google-ex
presses-dismay-over-700-mhz-auction/.
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They were triggered by a combination of lobbying to convince the FCC to
include the relevant terms in the auction rules,175 and of a company’s flexing
its financial muscle to achieve favorable rules.176
Another example concerns the standardization process of the Office
Open XML document standard, which Microsoft sponsored, as it was plan-
ning to use it as the main document format for its Office suite. While the
standardization process was ongoing, a large number of firms, individuals,
and associations coming from across the industry expressed their opposition
to Microsoft’s technical choices fearing that Microsoft would refuse to make
its standard fully open and interoperable—as it pledged—and instead dis-
criminate against or exclude competing software from reading OOXML files
and competing open standards, such as the ODF.177 In the end, after one of
the most contentious standardization procedures, the OOXML standard was
passed in a form that honored its open nature.  In this case, pressure coming
from multiple stakeholders in the industry was key to ensuring the represen-
tation of a multitude of interests, which were eventually embedded in the
technical specifications of the product.
Interestingly, this kind of tussle is not necessarily crystallized in a final
result or outcome, but it can be ongoing as the industry evolves. The power
games can be ongoing and the supply side map is subject to constant revi-
sion. In an influential paper, David Clark, who played a major role in the
design of internet protocols, eloquently talks about how engineers should
design network elements and software not to accommodate all needs and
goals but rather to accommodate indeterminacy. In his own words “[a]ny
practicing engineer knows that the process of design is. . . one of balancing
considerations and resolving tensions to get an acceptable specification”
175. The FCC started considering the conditions after the Public Interest Spectrum Coali-
tion submitted a relevant proposal in its comments. See Ex Parte Comments of the Ad Hoc
Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, PS DOCKET NO. 06-229 and WT DOCKET NOS. 06-150,
05-211, 96-86, at 9, 18-19 (filed Apr. 3, 2007); In the Matter of Service Rules for the 698-746,
747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands (Report for Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing), 22 FCC Rcd. 8064 (2007).
176. At least one analysis of the auction concludes that if it were not for Google’s bid-
ding, the openness condition would not have been triggered, because Verizon wasn’t planning
to meet the lowest threshold price. See Brusco, Lopomo, & Marx, supra note 173, at 112 (“We
can speculate that Verizon’s bidding strategy was not to bid on the C-block licenses if no other
bidder bid up to the reserve price. Verizon’s bidding in the early rounds of the auction is
consistent with this. Thus, we speculate that, without Google’s participation in the auction, the
C-block reserve price would not have been met, triggering a re-auction of that block without
the restrictions. In that case, we would expect prices for the C-block licenses that were more in
line with the other blocks and other recent spectrum sales.”).
177. See Ryan Paul, OOXML Critics: ISO Approval Demonstrates The Need For Reform,
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 3, 2008), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2008/04/oo
xml-critics-iso-approval-demonstrates-the-need-for-reform/; DeNardis, supra note 166, at
vii–ix; Dylan Bushell-Embling, Bias Claim on Big Office Vote, SUNDAY MORNING HERALD,
Feb. 26, 2008.
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(emphasis added).178 Designing for tussle is to design for variation in out-
come “so that the outcome can be different in different places, and [so that]
the tussle takes place within the design” (emphasis added).179
III. ABILITY TO EXCLUDE: DEMAND SIDE CONSIDERATIONS
The previous part described how the technological realities of digital
markets enable and facilitate competitive response, due to technology-in-
duced entry, or due to pressure from neighboring actors and competing inter-
ests, or due to relocation of functionality or value along the production
chain. Under these circumstances, the supply side of digital markets be-
comes less likely to be conducive to the kind of exclusion that can distort the
development and provision of products and services.
The supply side is only half the picture. A healthy supply side tells us
that rivals (or complements) are ready to supply the market with what the
exclusionary firm has deprived it of, but it does not tell us whether, or how
easily, demand side actors can purchase substitute products and services,
assuming they consider them as such.180 If consumers find it hard to access
or switch to substitute products or services, then intense competition on the
supply side will be of little help, as unmet supply will eventually wither. If,
on the other hand, there are low or no switching barriers and multiple ways
by which consumers can access their desired products and services, then the
full potential of enhanced supply side competition can be materialized.
This part focuses on how the technological realities of digital markets
enhance the ability of consumers to access products and services. One way
by which this is done is multihoming, which is the ability of an actor to
subscribe to multiple systems at the same time. Doing so limits the exclu-
sionary power of each system. The other way discussed here is interconnec-
tion, which, by creating redundancies, limits the power of each separate
actor to generate unilateral results. While the theory of interconnection has
been known for a long time, recent technological developments have in-
creased the applicability of interconnection, and are explored further herein.
A. Multihoming
Multihoming is the ability of subscribers to join multiple systems (i.e.
networks, platforms, etc.) at the same time. This allows them to access mul-
tiple environments and to draw complementary utility from all of them.181
178. Clark, supra note 12, at 463.
179. Id. at 466.
180. Demand side actors can be synonymous to consumers if by consumers one means
not only end consumers but also purchasers of products and services in any layer of the value
chain. In that sense end consumers would be demand side actors, but application developers
would also be demand side actors of the operating system market.
181. Jay Pil Choi, Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing, 28 J. INDUS. ECON.
607, 607 (2010).
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Under multihoming, subscribers enjoy the benefits of multiple systems and
do not depend exclusively on one of them. In essence, multihoming opens
up multiple paths between a source (product, service, application, etc.) and a
destination (users, consumers) through the intermediaries along the value
chain (operating systems, software delivery platforms, network operators,
device manufacturers, etc.). An example of multihoming on the side of mo-
bile application developers is the manufacturing of an application for more
than one mobile operating systems (e.g. iOS and Android); an example of
multihoming on the users’ side is the ability to use both the cellular network
and Wi-Fi on a mobile phone; an example of multihoming of intermediate
actors is a device manufacturer partnering with more than one mobile oper-
ating system developers (e.g. HTC’s mobile phones run Android or Win-
dows Mobile).
Under conditions of multihoming, effective exclusion becomes more
difficult, because the exclusionary practices of a system do not completely
block access to an input or distribution channel as long as one of the sides
also subscribes to another system. Put differently, multihoming creates a
form of redundancy in the market, and therefore weakens the power position
of bottlenecks and limits the effect of exclusionary practices, because it
opens up alternative paths to connect actors in the industry.182 The more
extensive multihoming is in every level of the value chain the less power is
concentrated in each link, and the easier it becomes for market players to
connect to each other.
Further, multihoming expands the potential adoption pool for developers
and providers, it creates more options for end users to better serve their
preferences, and it results in output increase and price decrease in the mar-
ket.183 Additionally, multihoming creates strategic pressure on systems not to
exclude for the following reason: in a two-sided system with developers on
one side and users on the other side, multihoming on one side reduces the
need for multihoming on the other side, because access to the subscribers on
the other side is guaranteed anyway.184 That is, if users multihome, develop-
182. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in HANDBOOK
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 373, 383–85 (Sumit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2006).
Competition is analogous to the degree of overlap between the networks subscribers mul-
tihome too. See Alexander Rasch, Platform Competition with Partial Multihoming Under Dif-
ferentiation, 12 ECON. BULL. 1, 1–2 (2007).
183. Choi, supra note 181, at 607-10; see also Economides, supra note 182.
184. This holds under the assumption that exclusive subscribers (end users or developers)
to a network are more valuable than subscribers who multihome. See Attila Ambrus et al.,
Either or Both Competition: A “Two-sided” Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewer-
ships (Working Paper), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/veranstaltungen/ICT2012/Papers/Rei
singer_Ambrus_Calvano.pdf. Roson also concludes that multihoming on one side reduces the
incentives to multihome on the other side. See Roberto Roson, Platform Competition with
Endogenous Multihoming (So. Sci. Res. Network Electronic Paper Collection, Working Pa-
per), http://ssrn.com/abstract=657901.
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ers can switch from an exclusionary system to a non-exclusionary one, and
they will still be able to reach all users. This creates incentives for the exclu-
sionary system to refrain from this practice for fear of driving away
developers.
There is no doubt that multihoming is neither a perfect alternative to
fully unobstructed competition nor a guarantee that every combination of
inputs and platforms will be possible, a result that could be obtained by the
complete banning of exclusion. Multihoming potentially imposes a cost to
subscribers (that of joining more than one systems),185 and it can reduce
welfare as well as competition under certain conditions.186
But as a matter of actual practice, and therefore as a matter of generating
actual results in how consumers access products and services and in how
manufacturers make products and services available to consumers, one
should notice its growing popularity. ComScore reports that the majority of
users multihome in several regards of their digital life, including modalities
of accessing the internet (desktop, smartphone, tablet), services they use (in-
cluding social media, e-commerce, and messaging services), media sources
and media outlets, and others.187 At the same time, most of the modern mo-
bile communication devices support both licensed and unlicensed spectrum
connectivity, doubling the channels through which consumers can access
services and applications.188 There is considerable evidence that the wireless
future will be dominated by smart or cognitive radios, which allow devices
to switch seamlessly between different bands of the spectrum—e.g. cellular,
185. Toker Doganoglu & Julian Wright, Multihoming and Compatibility, 24 INT’L. J.
INDUS. ORG. 45, 47 (2006); Jean J. Gabszewicz & Xavier Y. Wauthy, Two-Sided Markets and
Price Competition with Multi-homing, at 2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=975897; Sujit Chakravorti
& Roberto Roson, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Net-
works 24 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2004-09). The cost does not have to be
monetary. For example, when the FCC was scrutinizing the AOL – Time Warner merger, they
were considering mandating that AOL Messenger be interoperable with other messengers,
because AOL’s argument that users can simply install and use more than one messengers (i.e.
the cost of multihoming to multiple messengers) was deemed to be too burdensome for users.
See In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and
Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to
AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee, FCC 01-12, ¶¶ 153-174 (Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der) (2000).
186. It can reduce competition because subscribers buy more than once and so systems
don’t compete for exclusivity. For the same reason it can also reduce compatibility incentives.
Lack of competition can sustain prices at higher levels, and lack of compatibility can be wel-
fare reducing when compatibility is desirable, i.e. when network effects are strong and the cost
of achieving compatibility is low. See Doganoglu, supra note 185, passim.
187. COMSCORE, CROSS-PLATFORM FUTURE IN FOCUS 2016, passim (2016).
188. Travis E. Litman, Cognitive Radio: Moving Toward a Workable Framework for
Commercial Leasing of Public Safety Spectrum, 4 J. TELECOMM. HIGH TECH. LAW 249,
259–61 (2005).
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Wi-Fi, WiMAX—and can represent different connectivity systems to which
users can subscribe.189
Other market players multihome as well. For example, many manufac-
turers produce devices that run both Android and Windows Phone OS (and
sometimes even alternative operating systems like Ubuntu Phone). In the
Android ecosystem in particular, there are also multiple Android application
platforms on top of the official Google Play (e.g. Amazon’s AppStore) and
Android also supports installations from “unsupported” sources (e.g. a direct
link from a website), which give yet another option for service and applica-
tion developers to reach end users.
The effect of multihoming in all of these situations is that end users and/
or product and service developers can find multiple ways of connecting in
the marketplace. As these paths connecting products and services to consum-
ers multiply, the bottleneck power of each such path is weakened.
B. Interconnection and Compatibility
Multihoming as discussed previously represents a vertical relationship
between actors in different levels of the value chain, and it demonstrates
how the ability of a subscriber in one level to connect to multiple systems at
another level limits the power of each individual system and makes exclu-
sion less effective in the presence of other alternatives.
Instead of subscribers connecting to multiple systems, a similar effect
can be achieved horizontally by having systems in the same level connect to
each other so that there is more than one path to reach a system. Several
words are used to describe this arrangement but it is most commonly known
as interconnection: the physical and logical connection between two actors/
elements in a network for the purpose of exchanging traffic.190 Interconnec-
tion technically presupposes that network elements “speak” the same lan-
guage, otherwise they won’t be able to communicate. The use of mutually
agreed protocols that enable two different systems to communicate with
189. See, e.g., MICHAEL CALABRESE ET AL., REPORT FROM THE SPECTRUM INVENTORY
WORKING GROUP OF THE COMMERCE SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 4
(2010) (NTIA’s advisory panel opinion stating that “the communications industry is beginning
the implementation of a new generation of cellular technology that incorporates smart anten-
nas, Internet protocol, and other new techniques for content compression. Over the next 10 to
20 years, these new technologies will effectively multiply existing cellular-communications
spectrum allocations by at least an additional 10 times.”); see also Brad J. Bernthal et al.,
Trends and Precedents Favoring a Regulatory Embrace of Smart Radio Technologies, 2ND
IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON NEW FRONTIERS IN DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS NETWORKS 633
(2007).
190. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.5; EU Directive 2002/19/EC on Access to, and Interconnection
of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, Art. 2(b); ITU, NGN In-
terconnection and Access, GSR Discussion Paper, at 5 (2007); Daniel Spulber & Christopher
Yoo, Network Regulation: The Many Faces of Access, 1 J. COMPETITION LAW ECON. 635, 641
(2005); Gerald Faulhaber, Access (Does not Equal) Access (1) + Access (2), 2002 MICH. ST.
DCL LAW REV. 677, 686 (2002).
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each other makes them compatible,191 and lack of compatibility is tanta-
mount to exclusion.192
What interconnection and compatibility do is multiply the links between
systems (and between actors within systems) and, thereby, open up more
paths through which end users can access services and applications.193 As
actors across systems become more interconnected with each other, the abil-
ity of each individual actor to affect how traffic flows decreases, because the
availability of alternative paths through which data can be detoured under-
mines, much like multihoming, the power and effectiveness of bottlenecks
and exclusionary behavior.194 In fact, as Werbach has noted “interconnec-
tion, as a safety valve for routing around platform bottlenecks, is the best
mechanism to tame anticompetitive behavior in such an environment.”195
Common knowledge, for example, suggests that one of the main reasons
why the internet is considered to be so resilient and also hard to regulate end
to end is that it consists of several interconnected autonomous systems that
are intricately linked to each other, so that if one of them fails or refuses to
accept traffic, traffic can be routed around it to its destination.196 As a gen-
eral matter then, extensive interconnection and compatibility transform a
purely vertical value chain into a “diagonal” ecosystem. If, for instance, net-
work A blocks traffic that comes directly from source B, but is in a peering
agreement with network C, which stipulates that A must accept all traffic
from C (this is, by definition, the nature of peering agreements), then traffic
from B can be rerouted through C to reach A’s subscribers.197
The question now is whether interconnection and compatibility are de-
pendable options in terms of their natural occurrence, that is whether indus-
try dynamics do or will transition from a mere theoretical technical
availability of interconnection and compatibility to actual implementation
without the need for regulatory interference.
The prevailing line of thought suggests that as long as there are a few
players of comparable size in the market, it is in their interest to interconnect
and to achieve compatibility between their services.198 The rationale is that,
191. Joseph Farrell & Timothy Simcoe, Four Paths to Compatibility, in OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF DIGITAL ECONOMY 34, 34–38 (Martin Peitz & Joel Waldfogel eds., 2012).
192. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Networks and Compatibility: Implica-
tions for Antitrust, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 651, 655 (1994) (“the decision to produce and sell a
component that is incompatible with potentially complementary components is tantamount to
exclusion.”).
193. See, e.g., David Gilo, A Market-Based Approach to Telecom Interconnection, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2003).
194. Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1233, 1294–97 (2007).
195. Id. at 1297.
196. Spulber and Yoo, supra note 190, at 64 (making a similar point for secondary
peering).
197. Cf. Werbach, supra note 194, at 1294–95.
198. Jacques Cremer, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in the Commercial In-
ternet, 48 J. IND. ECON. 433 passim (2000) (“Degradation is more likely the larger the differ-
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with networks of roughly similar size, none of them can unilaterally domi-
nate the market through incompatibility or lack of interconnection, but, to
the contrary, they can exploit stronger network effects if they combine their
networks.199 It would take a rather dominant player in the market—and there
is some disagreement as to the exact market share required—to make exclu-
sion of other networks a profitable strategy.200
Additionally, the observation that a dominant player blocks interconnec-
tion and compatibility with smaller rivals is not in itself enough to prove
ability to harm smaller rivals without knowing their competitive strategy.
For example, Malueg and Schwartz develop a model where competition be-
tween the excluded smaller rivals serves as a promise for higher quality to
consumers and makes them more appealing than the larger network.201 It is
also known that the size of the network is not the only factor that weighs in
in consumer choices; their expectations from the network as well as how
well the network complements their existing choices and investments are
also important.202
Further, even in the presence of a dominant player, refusal to intercon-
nect or achieve compatibility does not inexorably result in anticompetitive
effects. Ostensibly, a dominant player would want to block interconnection
and compatibility to exclude the subscribers of the smaller networks and
deprive them of positive network externalities with the ultimate goal to lure
them into his own network. However, several factors need to be in place for
subscribers to switch to another (even bigger) network: network effects must
ence in installed bases.”); Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition
and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 425 (1985) (“[F]irms with good reputations or
large existing networks will tend to be against compatibility, even when welfare is increased
by the move to compatibility. In contrast, firms with small networks or weak reputations will
tend to favor product compatibility. . .”).
199. See Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio
Services, 155 FCC Rcd. 15975, ¶ 24 (Third Report and Order) (2000). See also Automatic and
Manual Roaming Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 15 FCC Rcd.
21628, ¶ 32 (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (2000).
200. See David Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Interconnection Incentives of a Large Net-
work, 38 (Georgetown Uni. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper 1.05 (2001) (“Overall our analysis
indicates that, for [given] parameter values. . . global degradation is unlikely to be profitable
unless the largest network controls substantially more than half the installed-base customers.
Regarding targeted degradation, we found that it is profitable in [Cremer, Ray, Tirole’s] exam-
ple only for a small set of parameter values.”).
201. Id. at 32 (“The logic is that a larger number of (Cournot) rivals implies stronger
competition among them, which—for suitable consumer expectations—leads to more new
subscribers being added and a concomitant increase in the relative quality of the rivals’ net-
work. Indeed, for some parameter values, if the largest network pursued global degradation
then the only possible equilibrium would be tipping to the rivals. Competition among the rivals
serves as a commitment to consumers that the rivals’ network will expand more aggressively
than would a single firm (for the same initial base), and this competition-based advantage of
the rivals’ network can overcome the disadvantage of its smaller installed base.”).
202. Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON.
PERSPECT. 93 passim (1994).
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be strong, switching costs must be low, coordination between the smaller
players must also be low,203 and subscribers must be unable or unwilling to
internalize the positive externality that they will create for the network they
join (excess momentum),204 or the negative externality for the network they
leave (excess inertia).205 Given these factors it is entirely possible that sub-
scribers of smaller networks do not want or do not need to switch to the
larger network, and therefore the larger network’s exclusionary policies are
less effective, causing an actor considering exclusion to steer away from it.
Moreover, a feature of interconnection and compatibility is that, to
achieve redundancy in the market, not all actors have to be connected to all
other actors. If network A interconnects with network B but not C, and C
interconnects with B, subscribers of network C can still reach subscribers of
network A (mutatis mutandis for compatibility). In that scenario, C may not
be in the position to strike a direct interconnection agreement with A, but the
desired effect can be achieved with B’s intermediation. Such indirect inter-
connection or compatibility may come with an additional cost, economic or
technical, but this is not an issue that lends itself to ex ante regulation.
What the above analysis shows is first, that interconnection can be an
effective mechanism by which the power of each individual node in a net-
work to serve as bottleneck is reduced, and second, that for interconnection
to break down to a point that actors are effectively excluded, a series of
market conditions must be in place. However, an important question re-
mains, which is whether the conditions described above are easy or hard to
encounter in digital markets. If they are hard to find, then interconnection as
a bypass/redundancy mechanism will be less relevant in the analysis of ex-
clusion; if, on the other hand, market forces and technological possibilities
result in a robust interconnection matrix, then interconnection can be relied
on with less need for regulatory or antitrust coercion. This is something to be
examined separately in every market, but there are indications that important
aspects of digital markets are becoming more interconnected. These mainly
relate to the underlying networks that support digital markets.
The main two reasons why the underlying network infrastructure is be-
coming more robustly interconnected is because the hierarchical structure of
the early IP interconnection model is being supplanted by secondary peer-
ing,206 and because the generalized transition to IP multiplies the links
203. Faulhaber, supra note 190, at 689–99 (where the author discusses the conditions
that need to be present for anticompetitive behavior to arise. A dominant firm will opt to not
interconnect if (a) it is substantially larger than its competitors, (b) there are strong network
effects, (c) switching costs are low, (d) smaller players don’t interconnect among themselves).
204. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities,
40 J. IND. ECON. 55, 55–56 (1992).
205. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 940–41 (1986).
206. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 8, at 55–69.
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among providers. Both result in more links created in the network, and
therefore less bottleneck power concentrated in the hands of each link.
Take, for example, data interconnection in the new wireless environ-
ment. Mobile carriers traditionally exchange traffic by virtue of negotiated
agreements between them, but this is not the only way. If these direct agree-
ments break down, operators can interconnect through the internet with or
without the use of an intermediary, but they also increasingly interconnect
through the so called IPX interconnection (IP eXchange), which is a collec-
tion of managed networks (IPX providers) that carry IP traffic globally
among wireless operators.207 IPX has many unique characteristics (e.g. as-
sured QoS, cascading payments), which make it a popular and valuable mar-
ket proposition.208 In effect, IPX creates an additional layer of
interconnection, which in fact has many advantages over direct or internet-
mediated interconnection.209 Because IPX is open to anyone who wants to
participate, there are many IPX providers and there is competition among
them. Under these circumstances, refusal of an operator to directly intercon-
nect through traditional means with another operator does not result in the
latter operator being effectively excluded from the communication matrix, or
even from the domain of the operator who refused direct interconnection.
Further, considering that TDM service and interconnection is being
phased out in favor of IP interconnection, the fact that operators have many
options to choose from diminishes the emergence of real bottlenecks. And
this, unlike TDM interconnection, does not only apply to voice service, but
essentially to any type of service, application, or content, since all traffic is
IP traffic in next generation networks. Consequently, to the extent that the
links between two points (nodes) in a network multiply, it becomes harder
for each of them to acquire enough power to engage in anticompetitive ex-
clusion. The market, instead, provides other routes to bypass it.
It is true that this may not always be the case. For instance, termination
monopoly still poses a problem, because for every modality of network ac-
cess, there is no route-around at the termination level.210 But even in this
207. In fact, there are additional variations of IP interconnection. See INTERNATIONAL
INTERCONNECT FORUM FOR SERVICES OVER IP, OVERVIEW OF NETWORK ACCESS TYPES FOR A
MULTISERVICE IP INTERCONNECTION (Release 1.1) (2012); See, e.g., Renjish K.R. Kumar, In-
ternational Mobile Data Roaming: Managed or Unmanaged?, in 9TH IEEE CONFERENCE ON
TELECOMM. INTERNET AND MEDIA TECHNO-ECONOMICS (CTTE) 1, 1–2 (2010).
208. GSM Association, Inter-Service Provider IP Backbone Guidelines 5.0, Official Doc-
ument IR 34 (2011).
209. John Baldwin et al., Evolution of the Voice Interconnection, 88 ERICSSON REV. 10
(2010). See also Natalija Gelvanovska, Coexistence of Traditional and IP Interconnection
(Int’l Telecom. Union, Global Symposium for Regulators Discussion Paper, 2009), at 14-17.
210. See European Regulators Group, ERG Common Statement on Regulatory Principles
of IP-IC/NGN Core, ERG (08) 26 Final NGN IP-IC CS 081016, at 78 (2008) (ERG (now
BEREC) explains that “though this [:IP] ubiquitous connectivity in principle has the potential
of breaking the termination monopoly for voice calls, the control functions on the service layer
generally will prevent such procedure. VoIP calls are set up using higher-level protocols, e.g.
Spring 2018] Exclusion in Digital Markets 231
case, the emergence of alternative ways of interconnection in other parts can
still be helpful. There is a difference in the negotiation power vis-a-vis ter-
mination between a large operator and individual small operators (which is
where the power of termination monopoly is expected to be exercised), and a
large operator and an IPX provider who represents the aggregate traffic of a
multitude of smaller (and/or larger) operators. In the latter case, even small
players can get a better deal through the collective bargaining power they
can amass. Therefore, the suggestion here is not that new options for inter-
connection will eliminate the ability to exclude, but that they increase and
enhance the bypassing mechanisms, thus making aggregation of power
harder.
IV. DURABILITY OF POWER
The previous part on ability to exclude discussed the conditions that
determine how easy or hard it is for firms to amass the necessary market
power to effectively exclude rivals from the market. But, even if firms suc-
ceed in positioning themselves in a way to be able to engage in exclusionary
conduct, adopting preventive or suppressive measures is not warranted un-
less the exclusionary conduct can persist in time.211 This is for two reasons:
first, because regulatory, judicial, or antitrust measures are quasi-irreversi-
ble, whose effect extends into the future, and therefore should be forward
looking and reflect expected future conditions.212 Starting from the assump-
tion of free self-correcting markets, intervention is warranted when the mar-
kets’ self-correcting mechanism has been given enough time to generate
results, and it has failed.213 In its stead, regulatory or antitrust intervention
will artificially create the desirable conditions. However, because these mea-
sures do not expire and are not recalled (sunset clauses are rare, and changes
in regulatory and antitrust policy are infrequent), the conditions they will
create are semi-permanent until they are rendered irrelevant by market
forces (or a policy change). Therefore, one should make sure that they are
indeed needed to replace what the market should have taken care of itself.
SIP, that provide a translation from an individual customer’s E.164 number or Internet-style
“user name” to an actual IP address that is needed for a call to be terminated. As this IP
address is only known by the customer’s VoIP provider, the termination monopoly is set to
remain also in the NGN world as the called party’s VoIP provider is still needed to terminate a
call, even though only with regard to signaling matters.”).
211. For how this requirement has been integrated as a requirement in regulatory and
antitrust analysis see supra Part 2.2.2.
212. COATES, supra note 15, at 10.
213. See, e.g., Commission Recommendation of 9.10.2014 on Relevant Product and Ser-
vice Markets Within the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to Ex Ante Regulation
in Accordance With Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 7-9
(Commission lists the relevant criteria to identify markets susceptible to ex ante regulations: a)
presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry, b) whether a market structure tends to-
wards effective competition within a relevant time horizon, c) the application of competition
law alone would not adequately address the market failure(s) concerned.).
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Second, such measures come with a cost and therefore their use should
justify the cost of intervention. The cost of regulation and antitrust enforce-
ment has been extensively analyzed; it includes among others the cost of
maintaining a regulatory or enforcement authority, the cost of monitoring
implementation of measures, and the cost of market complexity and dissua-
sion.214 As a result, if the ability to exclude is simply transitory, regulatory or
judicial measures might prove premature and unnecessarily burdensome.
This simple insight suggests that, in markets where the conditions con-
ducive to anticompetitive exclusion are harder to persist, regulatory and anti-
trust action might be less likely to be necessary. In fact, even if proxies of
market power, like supra-competitive profits, persist, one should still ensure
that there is an anticompetitive cause behind it, and therefore perhaps an
antitrust solution.215 Digital markets are generally thought to be fast-paced,
and have been theorized to be less suitable for heavy-handed regulatory or
antitrust measures.216 This is in no way to say that they should be exempt
from regulation or antitrust action,217 but that perhaps the nature of the in-
dustry is such that evidence of market power treated in isolation of the dy-
namic evolution of the industry is weaker proof of market failure that
regulatory and antitrust authorities may need to address, compared to other
industries, where the buildup and maintenance of anticompetitive power is
easier.218
This argument on the role of the durability of market power has been
made repeatedly in the literature with regard to digital markets, but it does
not seem to have fully convinced authorities and courts.219 This can be either
214. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, AND VERNON, supra note 43, at 39–48; Michael K
Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price
Fixer Now and Then, 68 GEO. LAW J. 1131 (1979); Wayne B. Gray, The Cost of Regulation:
OSHA, EPA and the Productivity Slowdown, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 998 (1987).
215. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, Int’l J. of Indus. Org. (forthcom-
ing), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/antitrustpopulism.pdf.
216. Teece & Coleman, supra note 8, at 843–46; Lawrence Sullivan, Is Competition
Policy Possible in High Tech Market?: An Inquiry Into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and
Broadband Regulation as Applied to “The New Economy,” 52 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L.
REV. 41, 43–44 (2001); Lopatka & Page, supra note 8; Schmalensee, supra note 8.
217. Even the most progressive of antitrust scholars agree that dominance and market
distortions are a possibility that cannot be ignored and for that reason antitrust and market
supervision still has a place and time. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 133. Rubinfeld,
supra note 7.
218. David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis
in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 18–20
(Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, & Scott Stern eds., 2002) (concluding that “a proper market-
power inquiry in new-economy industries must include a serious analysis of the vigor of dy-
namic competition. This requires looking beyond current sales figures.” Id. at 20).
219. See e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, at 9 (2007) (“There is no need to revise the antitrust laws to apply different rules to
industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological change are central fea-
tures.”); Alexander Italianer, Prepared Remarks on Level-playing Field and Innovation in
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because it is simply a false argument, meaning that it has been properly
articulated and yet rejected, or because the value of the argument has not
been proved or appreciated sufficiently.
Considering the stance of regulatory and antitrust authorities, one should
be happy to put the argument to rest if we trust their judgement. But there is
empirical literature, which has remained unaccounted for in the circles of
legal scholarship and case law, that informs the debate otherwise. The em-
pirical literature does not suggest that high technology markets are so com-
petitive as to obviate the need for oversight, but it does provide support for
the position that they are more competitive compared to other industries,
based on a number of metrics. This conclusion, to the extent that it is true,
should feed into the analysis of exclusion: the higher the competitive inten-
sity, the less sustainable is market power that can give rise to anticompetitive
exclusion. What this part attempts to do is discuss the argument on the vola-
tility of market power in high technology markets, and to refine it to better
reflect the realities of such markets.
A. Why Are Digital Markets Thought to Be Highly Competitive?
A number of explanations have been offered in support of the idea that
digital markets are less conducive to the buildup of the necessary market
power and conditions that would allow long-term exclusionary practices to
occur, the kind that can harm the competitive process (rather than individual
competitors—if that).
For one thing, the heightened competitive supply and demand condi-
tions as described previously in Sections 3 and 4 support the proposition that
effective long-term exclusion is harder to achieve in digital markets. But
various other explanations have already been offered. For instance, one of
the main thrusts behind digital markets’ dynamism may be that they are
characterized by network effects.220 Network effects help firms gain market
power faster than if network effects were not present, but since this also goes
for the their competitors, network effects can eventually result in the firms’
own demise.221 As a result, players in network industries enjoy fast growth,
Technology Markets, Conference on Antitrust in Tech. (Jan. 28, 2013) (“Allegedly, the con-
stant and rapid pace of technological innovation would make entrenched positions of market
power impossible to maintain. Well, if there are such characteristics present in a market, we
will fully acknowledge them in our cases, like we did in a recent merger case involving mobile
payments. But we do not think that ‘high-tech’ markets—however their boundaries may be
defined—should be generally immune from antitrust intervention.”); Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Prepared Remarks at Free State Found.’s Sixth Annual Telecomm. Policy Conference (Mar.
18, 2014).
220. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT. J. IND. OR-
GAN. 673, 675–99 (1996); Economides, supra note 40.
221. See Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network
Evolution in Telecommunications, in TOWARD A COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS-
TRY 58 (Gerald Brock ed., 1995); David Easley & Jon Kleinberg, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND
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but upon emergence of a competing wave of network effects, they also face
rapid displacement, making any market position precarious and, along with
it, practices that rely on that position.222
Further, sectoral surveys over the past twenty years suggest that tradi-
tional sources of advantage such as economies of scale, advertising, distribu-
tion systems, and R&D, albeit still important, can sometimes be trumped by
such features of technology-intensive industries as lower barriers to entry,
more frequent technological change, ease of switching on the side of con-
sumers, the dominant role of intellectual property and high rates of patenting
and cross-licensing.223 These developments increase mobility in the market
and allow only temporary advantage until competitors catch up with or out-
maneuver aggressors.224 In no small part because of technological interde-
pendence, vehement standard competition and continuous experimentation
are considered staple characteristics of high technology industries.225
It has also been noted that technology-intensive industries present
greater product differentiation and are in a better position to address niche
audiences and more specialized consumer needs.226 The larger scope of
available solutions leads to higher “internal” competition, faster obsoles-
cence and ultimately to new waves of innovation.227 Lucrative niche markets
can then serve as the source of funding for the new waves of innovation.228
Moreover, because, in highly technical industries, human capital and
know-how often form a large part of the innovation cost, disruptive innova-
tions that affect business models and organizational paradigms are easier to
bring to the market compared to innovations that require primarily capital-
MARKETS 479 et seq. (2010); Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In:
Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION VOLUME III 1974 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007).
222. See Sangin Park, Quantitative Analysis of Network Externalities in Competing Tech-
nologies: The VCR Case, 86 REV. ECON. STAT. 937 (2004) (where the author examines how
network effects helped the VCR standard overtake the Betamax standard).
223. See, e.g., Richard D’Aveni, HYPERCOMPETITION: MANAGING THE DYNAMICS OF
STRATEGIC MANEUVERING (1994); Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 17; Lacy Glenn Thomas,
The Two Faces of Competition: Dynamic Resourcefulness and The Hypercompetitive Shift, 7
ORGAN. SCI. 221 (1996); Haim Mendelson & Ravindran R. Pillai, Industry Clockspeed: Mea-
surement and Operational Implications, 1 MANUF. SERV. OPER. MGMT. 1 (1999). See also Guy
Gellatly & Valerie Peters, Understanding the Innovation Process: Innovation in Dynamic Ser-
vice Industries, STATISTICS CANADA, ANALYTICAL STUDIES BRANCH RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
No. 127, 20 (1990).
224. Bala Chakravarthy, A New Strategy Framework for Coping with Turbulence, 38
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 67 (1997).
225. Greenstein, supra note 169, at 46–63.
226. Alok K. Chakrabarti & Eric H. Kessler, Innovation Speed: A Conceptual Model of
Context, Antecedents, and Outcomes, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1143, 1156–57 (1996).
227. Morton I Kamien & Nancy L Schwartz, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION
9–11 (1982); Ross Brennan, Evolutionary Economics and the Markets-as-Networks Approach,
35 IND. MARK. MGMT. 829, 831–32 (2006).
228. Chakrabarti & Kessler, supra note 226.
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intensive investments.229 In such an environment, market leaders may have a
hard time maintaining their dominance against rivals.230
B. Incorporating Empirical Evidence
The above-mentioned theories all sound plausible, but they have been
known for a while to regulatory and antitrust authorities and have only had
limited influence. It is perhaps helpful to notice, however, that there is em-
pirical literature that sheds light on the matter, which has been ignored so
far, and that, if incorporated, can provide a more complete picture. This is
the purpose of this part.
A few perambulatory comments are due before proceeding to the empir-
ical evidence. First, the available empirical literature does not always have
as an exclusive focus high technology or digital industries. Many (but not
all) of the studies look into potential shifts of the competitive dynamics of
multiple industries in general, some focus on the manufacturing sector and
some on high technology industries in particular. In any case, the studies that
survey multiple industries based on general datasets also cover high technol-
ogy industries and, in that sense, they are still relevant.
Second, the available data on which these studies were based stops in
the early 2000s. As a result, much of the internet and mobile revolutions are
not reflected in the results of these studies. However, the theoretical factors
underpinning hypercompetition (see supra 5.1) seem to apply with even
greater vigor in the post-millennium digital environment, and so one can
extrapolate from the available studies. It is acknowledged however that this
data gap should raise the level of cautiousness the results are approached
with.
Third, while it is tempting to believe that these studies actually prove or
disprove hypercompetition, one should pause to think what hypercompeti-
tion and competitiveness mean in this context; in other words what it means
to say that digital markets are more competitive than other markets, or that
digital markets today are more competitive than in the past. The preferred
proxy for measuring competitiveness and the one thought to exhibit the clos-
est association with it is profit margins, since they show how much more a
firm can charge above the (perfectly) competitive price.231 The problem with
profit margins is that they are hard to measure even at the firm level, let
alone the industry level. Moreover, and as expected, there is not always a
good correlation between profit margins and competitiveness. For example,
Apple famously operates with large profit margins but it is doubtful how
229. See Mehmet Yorukoglu & Thomas F. Cooley, Innovation and Imitation in an Infor-
mation Age, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASSOC. 406, 407 (2003).
230. Walter J. Ferrier, Ken G. Smith & Curtis M. Grimm, The Role of Competitive Ac-
tion in Market Share Erosion and Industry Dethronement: A Study of Industry Leaders and
Challengers, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 372 (1999).
231. See SULLIVAN, GRIMES, & SAGERS, supra note 31, at 109-10.
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well this translates into its competitive position in the market given its far
from dominant market share (customer loyalty, reputational and Veblen ef-
fect factors, and other behavioral economics insights may be in a better posi-
tion to explain such observations).
Other proxies include mortality rates (intense competition makes firm
survival more difficult), market shares and sales (intense competition makes
maintenance of market shares and sales more difficult), return on assets (in-
tense competition drives down profitability relative to assets), and stock
market value (intense competition makes stock value volatile). All these
variables are linked to how easy or hard it is to maintain a competitive ad-
vantage, but none of them individually or all of them taken together can
capture the full picture of the competitive pressure in the market. In other
words, these studies show correlation, but it may be impossible to show
causation. That said, the variables used are the best approximation of com-
petition we have, and even assuming that the evidence is not perfect, it
would be unwise to ignore it. In fact, one can argue that if studies that rely
on different metrics for competition reach the same conclusion, then the con-
clusion is more robust. That is to say, if one study deduces hypercompetition
from an increase in profit volatility, and another study deduces hypercompe-
tition from increased entry and mortality, then it seems that the conclusion is
corroborated on more than one ground.
A short summary of the studies now follows (results are summarized in
Table 2). In its general form hypercompetition was popularized by D’Aveni
in his book Hypercompetition,232 where he claimed that four factors (grow-
ing consumer demands, technology, falling entry barriers, easier access to
capital) contributed in the last decades to creating such market conditions
that rapidly generate new competitive advantages with the effect of neutral-
izing the competitive advantages, leaving the industry in constant dise-
quilibrium and disarray.233 D’Aveni’s claim cuts across several industries,
including high technology industries, and provides anecdotal evidence in
support of using multiple variables. A number of subsequent studies on mul-
tiple industries supported D’Aveni’s hypothesis. A more analytically rigor-
ous study by Thomas followed two years later, focusing on the
manufacturing sector sampled between 1958-1991 using stock market value
as the relevant variable, and found a hypercompetitive shift.234 A subsequent
study by Thomas and D’Aveni used profits as the relevant variable and
found increased profit volatility in the manufacturing sector between 1950
and 2002.235 Wiggins and Ruefli, using a dataset of more than 40 industries
232. D’Aveni, supra note 223.
233. Richard A. D’Aveni, Waking up to the New Era of Hypercompetition, 21 WASH. Q.
183 (1998).
234. Thomas, supra note 223.
235. L G Thomas & Richard D’Aveni, The Changing Nature of Competition in the US
Manufacturing Sector, 1950—2002, 7 STRATEGIC. ORG. 387 (2009).
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between 1972 and 1997, and return on assets and Tobin’s q as variables,
confirmed that competitive advantage is harder to sustain across both low
and high technology industries.236
Another set of studies found targeted support for high technology indus-
tries. Mendelson and Pillai developed the idea that IT industries operate on a
more dynamic clockspeed basis, using a combined index of three elements
over a sample of companies between 1992 and 1994: the fraction of total
revenue derived from new products, the total duration of product innovation,
and the rate of decline in the prices of input materials.237 Vaaler and McNa-
mara surveyed high and very high technology industries (which they deter-
mine on the basis of R&D intensity) using multiple variables like market
shares, and mortality rates, and found support for very high technology
firms, but not for high technology firms.238 Castrogiovanni found, based on a
sample of manufacturing firms between 1967 and 1992 and using multiple
variables including sales, profits, and employment rates, that new industries
(defined as those that first appear in the SIC system in 1972 compared to
1967) exhibit higher dynamism that old ones.239 Foster and Kaplan surveyed
multiple industries using various metrics like profits and mortality rates, and
found that high technology industries exhibit increased competitiveness rates
in waves; that is, there are periods of hypercompetition but not a steady shift
towards more competitive conditions.240
A few more specialized studies also seem to support hypercompetition.
Lee et al. studied the effect of complementarity among computer programs
and showed that, in the years between 1990 and 2002, software complemen-
tarities among products increased, which in turn heightened exposure and
volatility. As a result, they found that market shares in the software industry
were more difficult to maintain. Brown and Goolsbee studied the effect of
online competition in the insurance market between 1992 and 1997 and
found that online presence caused prices to fall by 8–15%. This was read to
imply that online competition increases competition in general (within the
boundaries of the market).
There was only one study that found no support for hypercompetition.
McNamara et al. surveyed multiple industries on the basis of multiple vari-
ants, including return on assets and mortality rates, and concluded that the
236. Robert R Wiggins & Timothy W Ruefli, Schumpeter’s Ghost: Is Hypercompetition
Making the Best of Times Shorter?, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 887 (2005).
237. Mendelson & Pillai, supra note 223.
238. Paul M Vaaler & Gerry McNamara, Are Technology-Intensive Industries More Dy-
namically Competitive? No and Yes, 21 ORG. SCI. 271 (2010).
239. Gary J. Castrogiovanni, Organization Task Environments: Have They Changed
Fundamentally Over Time?, 28 J. MGMT. 129 (2002).
240. RICHARD FOSTER & SARAH KAPLAN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: WHY COMPANIES
THAT ARE BUILT TO LAST UNDERPERFORM THE MARKET—AND HOW TO SUCCESS FULLY
TRANSFORM THEM (2011).
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only hypercompetitive era was between 1985 and 1988.241 They pointed out
that there does not seem to be a shift towards more competition in general,
but without saying that there are not periods during which, for whatever
reason, competitive intensity is higher. Assumingly, this also means that one
should aim to be aware of which of these periods might be occurring and
adjust policy-making accordingly as these periods unfold. Their results seem
hard to reconcile with the rest of the literature, but they can be attributable
mainly to the use of different variables, the particular methodology applied,
and the different cohorts of firms that studies used, even if they relied on the
same datasets.
Study Industry Dates Metric Hyper/c Comments
D’ Aveni, 1994 Multiple - 1992 Multiple Y Anecdotal evidence. 
Thomas, 1996 Manufacturing 1958-91 Stock market value Y Hypercompetitive shift. 
Mendelson & 
Pillai 
IT industries 1992-94 Multiple (revenue,
product innovation 
rate, price of input
material) 
Y IT industries operate at higher
clock-speed. 
Brown & 
Goolsbee, 2000 
Insurance 1992-97 Price Y Prices fell by 8-15% because of 
online competition. 
Foster & Kaplan, 
2001 
Multiple 1962-98 Multiple (profits, 
exit etc.) 
Y/N High-tech industries exhibit 
hypercompetition in waves 
Castrogiovanni, 
2002 
Manufacturing 1967-92 Multiple (sales, 
profits, employment)
Y/N New industries exhibit higher
dynamism (change in 
environmental elements) 
McNamara et al., 
2003 
Multiple 1978-97 Multiple (ROA, exit 
etc.) 
N Only hyper-competitive era was 
1985-88. 
Wiggins & 
Ruefli, 2005 
Multiple 1972-97 ROA, Tobin’s q Y Competitive advantage is harder 
to sustain. Hypercompetition 
confirmed across both low and 
high-tech industries.  
Thomas & D’
Aveni, 2009 
Manufacturing 1950-02 Profits Y Steady increase in profit 
volatility. 
Vaaler & 
McNamara, 2010 
High tech & 
very high tech 
1978-97 Multiple (returns, 
market share, exit) 
Y/N Validation only for very high-
tech firms. 
Lee et al., 2010 Software 1990-02 Market share Y Complementarity among
products increases 
hypercompetition (market 
instability). 
TABLE 2: EVIDENCE OF HYPERCOMPETITION IN HIGH TECH MARKETS. DARK
GREEN INDICATES STRONG EVIDENCE, LIGHT GREEN INDICATES
WEAK EVIDENCE, RED INDICATES NO EVIDENCE.
241. See Vaaler & McNamara, supra note 238, at 286.
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The overall impression from these studies seems to be that, at least as
regards high technology industries, and under the qualifications offered pre-
viously, competitive advantage is harder to maintain compared to other in-
dustries, and/or that competitive advantage is harder to maintain now
compared to decades ago. This does not and should not be read to mean that
antitrust and regulation in high technology industries are obsolete. However,
going back to the principle that regulation and competition enforcement are
warranted only if the market imperfection they seek to rectify will reasona-
bly persist in time—otherwise one should wish to forego the cost of regula-
tion or enforcement and let the market self-correct—the results presented
here suggest that an elevated measure of proof is required to answer that
condition in the affirmative.
The antitrust action against the exclusionary practices in the Microsoft
and IBM cases exemplify well this point. Microsoft, having been found to
engage in exclusionary behavior in the browser market (through tying/inte-
gration of Internet Explorer to Windows), was forced to implement measures
to give consumers greater choice in said market (e.g. by prompting consum-
ers to choose their preferred browser).242 However, Microsoft’s already rap-
idly declining presence and its eventual irrelevance in that market, unrelated
to the imposed measures,243 shows that, in markets where competition is on
the rise, regulatory and antitrust enforcement can more easily prove super-
fluous. The Microsoft case is often mentioned in conjunction with the fa-
mous IBM antitrust case that was initiated by the US government in 1969,
on the grounds of abuse of market power, and eventually dropped 13 years
later with the government realizing that the market conditions were vastly
different from when the case was initiated.244 Such cases can serve as valua-
ble cautionary reminders about the appropriate treatment of hypercompeti-
tive industries.
C. Refinements
One thing the above studies do not capture is the evolutionary state of
the industry during which competitiveness is measured. The analysis showed
some support for the idea that a large number of industries, including high
technology industries, are becoming more competitive in general, or, in the
242. Peter Sayer, EU Accepts Microsoft’s Commitments to Offer Browser Choice,
MACWORLD (Dec. 16, 2009), https://www.macworld.com/article/1145120/microsoft_eu_brow
ser.html.
243. The declining market shares of Firefox and Opera, which were offered as Tier 1
alternatives in the selection screen, but also the global, rather than EU-specific, consistency of
browser adoption trends, show that the measure did not achieve its purpose.
244. John Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L. J.
145, 161-62 (2000); Edward T. Pound, Why Baxter Dropped the I.B.M. Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
9, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/09/business/why-baxter-dropped-the-ibm-suit
.html.
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alternative, that regardless of general competitiveness trends, high technol-
ogy industries are inherently more competitive than other industries. While
this conclusion is useful in itself, it is also true that the competitive condi-
tions within industries change as they evolve, and the permanence and im-
portance of any potential competitive advantage changes accordingly too.
Assumingly, both the anticompetitive implications of exclusion as business
strategy, and the appropriate response will differ depending on whether the
industry under scrutiny is in its infancy, maturity, or decline, regardless of its
inherent or comparative competitiveness. This proposition is explored
below.
There is not a single way to look at industry evolution. Some industries
follow well-studied patterns, while others are more unpredictable and less
well-understood. While this ambiguity presents analytical difficulties, as
regulators, authorities, and courts must identify which pattern—if any—fits
which market, what can be said with certainty is that it would be unwise for
these institutions to forego an attempt to incorporate an evolutionary analy-
sis into their reasoning for intervention. Failing to do so risks untimely or
unwarranted intervention.
The mainstream description of industry evolution is found in the prod-
uct life cycle theory, which introduced the now familiar S-curve to describe
how products and markets mature.245 It distinguishes between four stages:
introduction, growth, maturity and decline.246 In the introduction stage the
product develops its main qualities and characteristics, and innovation rates
are high, as is risk; in the growth stage quality improves and consumer de-
mand grows; in the maturity stage the product acquires its main characteris-
tics, differentiation drops and market saturation occurs; and in the decline
stage competition thins out, margins contract, and product development
slows down.247
Abernathy, Utterback and Dosi, in a similar classification, divide evolu-
tion in two phases, the pre-paradigmatic and the paradigmatic.248 The pre-
245. For a graphical summary of different curves of product life cycles see David R.
Rink & John E. Swan, Product Life Cycle Research: A Literature Review, 7 J. BUS. RES. 219,
221–23 (1979); William E. Cox, Product Life Cycles as Marketing Models, 40 J. BUS. 375,
382 (1967). See also Joel Dean, Pricing Policies for New Products, HARVARD BUS. REV.
(1967), https://hbr.org/1976/11/pricing-policies-for-new-products. The PLC theory is applica-
ble to both individual products and markets. See Yoram Wind, A Note on the Operationaliza-
tion of the Product Life Cycle Concept, WHARTON 3-4 (1975), https://marketing.wharton.u
penn.edu/files/?whdmsactionid.=public:main.file&fileID=1884.
246. See PORTER, supra note 93, at 158; PHILIP KOTLER & KEVIN LANE KELLER, MAR-
KETING MANAGEMENT 571–74, 590 (13th ed. 2008).
247. See PORTER, supra note 93, at 159–61.
248. See James M. Utterback & William J. Abernathy, A Dynamic Model of Process and
Product Innovation, 3 OMEGA INT’L. J. MGMT. SCI. 639 (1975); Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Pro-
cedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 26 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120 (1988);
Michael L Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological Discontinuities and Organizational
Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 441 (1986); Scott Gallagher & Seung Ho Park, Innova-
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paradigmatic phase roughly corresponds to the introduction stage of the
product life cycle theory, and is characterized by fluidity in design, high
uncertainty, innovation and experimentation, small market size and low de-
mand.249 Once a dominant design emerges, the market moves to the paradig-
matic phase, which sees increasing standardization around the dominant
design and market expansion, much like the growth and maturity stages of
the product life cycle theory predicts.250
Although the number of stages in these theories fluctuates,251 there is a
clear evolutionary path common to both of them: initially, new products,
services, and markets go through a flux stage during which they acquire the
main characteristics that will define their form throughout their life cycle;
then, they enter the phase where details in the design are filled in, the prod-
uct or service takes its most representative form and the market expands
around it.252 Until markets stabilize at or after this stage, both potentially
(anti)competitive dynamics and the response to them should be analyzed
with extreme caution.
In particular, in the introduction stage perceived anticompetitive exclu-
sionary effects can well be transitory and misleading. Young product and
service markets are highly experimental and fluid,253 there is constant rede-
sign and adaptation to match market feedback, which itself is rudimentary,254
and the inherent potentials of innovation are unclear and so are consumer
demand and needs.255 Accordingly, exclusionary practices can be part of the
experimentation to get the initial design right, and any market power that
builds up during this phase and enables potentially anticompetitive exclusion
is contingent upon the success of the proposed design, something that
neither the firm nor regulators or courts are in the position to know. During
this phase, the innovator should be let alone “[to] be intimately coupled to
tion and Competition in Standard-based Industries: A Historical Analysis of the US Home
Video Game Market, 49 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 67 (2002). See gener-
ally Devendra Sahal, PATTERNS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1981).
249. Utterback & Abernathy, supra note 248, at 643.
250. Id. at 644–46.
251. There are many other variations on top of those presented here. See, e.g., Rink &
Swan, supra note 245, at 222; Chester Wasson, DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND PROD-
UCT LIFE CYCLES 3–10 (1974); Utterback & Abernathy, supra note 248, at 641–45.
252. See Dosi, supra note 248, at 1159–63; Fernando F. Suarez, Battles for Technologi-
cal Dominance: An Integrative Framework, 33 RES. POL’Y 271, 271 (2004); James M. Ut-
terback & Fernando F. Suarez, Innovation, Competition, and Industry Structure, 22 RES.
POL’Y 1, 5–7 (1993).
253. Cf. Donald K. Clifford, Jr., Leverage in the Product Life Cycle, 85 DUN’S REV. &
MODERN INDUS. 62 (1965).
254. PORTER, supra note 93, at 159–61.
255. Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts:
Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other,
14 SOC. STUD. SCI. 399, 421-24 (1984).
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the market,”256 which involves picking the right partners and, as a logical
inference, excluding those that are deemed inappropriate or threatening.
Even as the market grows in later stages, exclusionary effects enabled
by the competitive advantage of having come up with or adopted the domi-
nant design can still be volatile. There is still uncertainty around how com-
petitive the market will become, what the intensity and effect of entry is, and
ultimately, whether the market will be able to constrain anticompetitive ef-
fects on its own. It is only until the maturity phase, when the market stabi-
lizes, that one can make a relatively safe assessment as to the effect of
exclusion and the benefits of regulatory or antitrust measures. It may seem
that this is too narrow a window for appropriate regulatory or antitrust ac-
tion, but the truth is that, in the PLC stream of theories, the maturity stage is
the one that lasts the longest, and so there are still plenty of engagement
opportunities for antitrust and regulatory authorities. PLC’s implication for
antitrust and regulatory action is with regard to picking the appropriate
timing.
What complicates the task of identifying appropriate timing is that not
all markets follow the structured path PLC suggests. There are specific ex-
amples of industries that diverge either because of their different order of
evolutionary phases, or because their evolution was heavily influenced by
demand-side factors, something that the PLC streams assign marginal value
to.257 More specifically, to digital markets, what complicates the definition
of evolutionary phases, and the pinpointing of transition points from one
phase to another, is the protean nature of the products and services in these
markets.
Digital markets often comprise large technical systems (LTS), namely
large “coherent structures comprised of interacting, interconnected compo-
nents,” or complex products and systems (CoPS), a similar type that is char-
acterized by a large number of specialized components and subsystems that
are usually hierarchically organized and that present a high degree of engi-
neering intensity and technological novelty. We can collectively call them
large complex systems.258 Large complex systems often exhibit continuous
interactions and recombinability among their components which can leave
them in a constant state of flux, thereby preventing them from reaching a
paradigmatic stage where basic properties have solidified.259 This is by no
256. David J Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integra-
tion, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 290–91 (1986).
257. Steven Klepper, Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle,
AM. ECON. REV. 562, 563 (1996).
258. Mike Hobday, Product Complexity, Innovation and Industrial Organization, 26
RES. POL’Y 689, 691–92 (1998); Andrew Davies, The Life Cycle of a Complex Product Sys-
tem, 1 INT’L. J. INNOVATION. MGMT. 229, 230–32 (1997). See also Ying-Tao Ren & Khim-
Teck Yeo, Research Challenges on Complex Product Systems (CoPS) Innovation, 23 J. CHI-
NESE INST. INDUS. ENGINEERS 519, 521–23 (2006).
259. Davies, supra note 258, at 233-38; Hobday, supra note 258, at 700-01.
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means always the case (aircraft engines are an example of CoPS that has
acquired a final form as a project), but it is more common in large complex
systems that do not develop under the management of a single authority. In
that sense, the contribution of unaffiliated third parties makes them more
open, decentralized, and susceptible to unpredictable disruptions and innova-
tions that shape them and the market around them.
Markets that are structured around platforms, which is very common in
the digital environment, may also evolve less linearly than the PLC stream
of theories suggests. This is because of the separation between the platform
itself and its inputs/components, and the feedback loop that arises between
the two.260 The bidirectional relationship between platform and complements
can change the boundaries, nature, and purpose of the platform, and by ex-
tension the market around it.261
In this context, the assessment of anticompetitiveness can be tricky. To
take social networks for example, the service has evolved from being a sim-
ple online profile, to providing a platform for applications, payment func-
tionality, integration with third-party websites, messaging functionality,
credentials management functionality, etc. To the extent the market never
really stabilizes, it is hard to make an accurate assessment of competitive
conditions, the effects of exclusionary practices, and also the effectiveness
of regulatory and antitrust action.262 Admittedly, not all platforms exhibit
this kind of feedback loop with their environment.263 But the argument still
stands: even if one is able to identify, attribute, and punish anticompetitive
exclusionary policies of a platform firm, imposing behavioral (or structural)
remedies, either by means of antitrust enforcement or regulatory measures,
would be an exercise in futility, if the nature of the firm and market are
bound to change soon thereafter.
V. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
As mentioned previously, it is not enough to demonstrate that an exclu-
sionary practice is capable of anticompetitive effects (considering supply
and demand conditions), or that these effects are likely to persist in time so
that intervention is needed to fill in for the gap the market’s own coping
mechanisms leave. It must further be shown that the behavior under scrutiny
260. Thomas R. Eisenmann, Managing Proprietary and Shared Platforms: A Life-Cycle
View, HBS Working Paper 07-105, at 2 (2007). See also Eisenmann et al., Opening Platforms:
How, When and Why?, (Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper 2008), passim.
261. Amrit Tiwana, Benn Konsynski & Ashley A Bush, Research Commentary—Plat-
form Evolution: Coevolution of Platform Architecture, Governance, and Environmental Dy-
namics, 21 INFO. SYS. RES. 675 (2010).
262. Cf. the antitrust cases against MySpace and Facebook, LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MyS-
pace, Inc., 304 F. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 2008); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C
08-5780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010).
263. Llewellyn D W Thomas, Erkko Autio & David M Gann, Architectural Leverage:
Putting Platforms in Context, 28 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 198, 199–205 (2014).
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is the result of abuse (“bad conduct”) of a firm’s position and market power,
because otherwise we would be condemning firms simply for acquiring or
possessing (even persistent) market power by lawful means.264
While the abuse element is mostly associated with antitrust, regulatory
theory also requires a showing of market failure, rather than simply subop-
timal market structure. At least as regards the prevention of exclusionary
conduct (as opposed, e.g., to price regulation or welfare redistribution ratio-
nales for regulation), regulators intervene when they conclude that market
players have the ability and incentive to use their market power to shut out
competition,265 not simply if market players have market power, since it is
conceivable that concentrated markets can be the natural and/or most effi-
cient state of the market if large market shares and power have been ac-
quired lawfully.266 In a way, it is recognized that the mere possession of
market power is not an offense. It is rather the combination of market power
and anticompetitive conduct that antitrust law seeks to avert, and it is the
artificial maintenance of sub-competitive conditions that regulation seeks to
avert.
By maintaining this important distinction, antitrust and regulatory policy
ensure, on the one hand, that firms have the incentive to compete aggres-
sively and reap the benefits of their success, and, on the other hand, that any
competitive advantage is the result of business acumen and not of harmful
conduct. As Justice Scalia has stated:
“[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an im-
portant element of the free-market system. The opportunity to
charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what at-
tracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incen-
tive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticom-
petitive conduct.” (emphasis in original).267
The difficult question here is what is defined as acceptable competitive
behavior and what as abusive. Like with every legal concept, there is some
264. HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 296–97. See also Grinnell, 86 S.Ct. at 570–71.
265. Cento Veljanovski, Economic Approaches to Regulation, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF REGULATION 17, 20–23 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, & Martin Lodge eds., 2010).
See also, e.g., the justification for the Open Internet regulations by the FCC in Open Internet
Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 75-103 (2015) (“The record on remand continues to convince us that
broadband providers—including mobile broadband providers—have the incentives and the
ability to engage in practices that pose a threat to Internet openness, and as such, rules to
protect the open nature of the Internet remain necessary. Today we take steps to ensure that the
substantial benefits of Internet openness continue to be realized.”).
266. CHRISTOPHER DECKER, MODERN ECONOMIC REGULATION 18–19 (2014).
267. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407.
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definitional uncertainty. The Supreme Court has ruled that antitrust laws are
not meant to apply “against conduct which is competitive, even severely so,
but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself,”268
(emphasis added). Unlawful conduct is that which is “directed at smothering
competition.”269 In the same vein, the Court of Justice of the European
Union only outlaws “[business] methods different from those governing nor-
mal competition in products or services,” which have “the effect of hinder-
ing the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market
or the growth of that competition” (emphasis added).270 In other words, anti-
trust law seeks to protect competition “on the merits,” no matter how aggres-
sive.271 Regulatory practice works in the same direction; it takes action to
promote rather than stifle competition on the merits. As the European Com-
mission has put it “the objective of any ex ante regulatory intervention is
ultimately to produce benefits for end-users by making retail markets com-
petitive on a sustainable basis.”272
The possible justifications that support a conclusion of competition on
the merits as opposed to conduct that tends to unfairly destroy competition
itself, are, of course, specific to each case. So, for example, exclusive agree-
ments, which have been traditionally looked at with great suspicion, can be
deemed acceptable if they are of short duration, and come with procompeti-
tive justifications like supporting a business plan that requires a guaranteed
line of supply. But what I want to suggest in this part is that, in digital
markets in particular, there are additional justifications underlying exclu-
sionary practices, which are specific to the nature of digital markets, and
which can reveal their meritorious nature and therefore render them accept-
able. These justifications relate to the nature of digital markets and the dy-
namics of competition in such markets.
268. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
269. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
270. Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Com-
munities, EU:C:1979:36, para. 91.
271. See Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325,
1338 (7th Cir. 1986) (“injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous competition” and therefore
“to deter aggressive conduct is to deter competition.”). In Irish Sugar the Court of Justice
noted that “an undertaking in a dominant position cannot have recourse to means other than
those within the scope of competition on the merits,” an idea expressed also in AKZO, where
the Commission accepted that firms are “entitled to compete on the merits.” Case T-228/97
Irish Sugar v Commission, EU: T:1999:246, ¶ 111. See also Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v
Commission, EU:C:2012:770, ¶ 75.
272. Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC, Commission Recommendation of 17
December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications
sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Com-
munications Networks and Services, 2007 O.J. (L 344/65).
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A. Locking-in as the New Monopolist’s Reward
One of the common business practices in digital markets is to give away
combinations of products and services. Firms routinely tie products together,
integrate functionalities, impose full-line requirements, or otherwise provide
favorable treatment to their own products and services to the exclusion of
competitors. Consider for example Android, which in most versions comes
together with a bundle of other Google applications like Gmail and Google
Play. Rivals have complained that the tying of Android with Google’s appli-
cations, and the bundling of Google’s applications together, creates an unfair
competitive advantage for Google, which in turn makes competition on the
merits harder or impossible for them.
It is easy to see the case against Google here: Google uses its market
power in the mobile operating systems market to promote its other services
and products, which can result in the exclusion of rival services and prod-
ucts.273 But if Google acquired its market power through lawful means, and
if it cannot exercise (by exercise I do not mean abuse) that market power
through the usual route of the pricing mechanism, since its products and
services are mostly free, to reap the benefits of its success, should it still be
banned from exercising market power through different means?
In traditional markets, where prices are a key metric of success, com-
mon economic thinking suggests that if a monopolist acquires a dominant
position through business acumen, then the monopoly rents they can reap
once in that position are their reward for outperforming competitors and
should not be taken away from them.274 It is not the purpose of antitrust or
regulation to artificially keep prices low, if their high level is the result of
normal competition or the natural propensity of the market.275 To the con-
trary, industrial policy rewards innovators and good performers through a
variety of means, for instance granting temporary monopolies (e.g., patents
and copyrights),276 being more lenient on research and development schemes
that would otherwise raise collusion concerns,277 or tolerating high prices
that are the result of a firm’s (lawful) prevailing strategy in the market.278
273. See, e.g. supra note 25 (noting the fears the European Commission expressed in
European Commission Press Release IP/15/4780).
274. See Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least
for a short period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place.”). See also Philippe
Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q. J. ECON. 701
(2005) (discussing the relationship between competition, profits, and innovation); Kamien &
Schwartz, supra note 227 at 24–31.
275. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 291; accord Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922 (1st
Cir. 1984).
276. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the
Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51 (2002).
277. See JONATHAN FAULL & ALI NIKPAY, FAULL AND NIKPAY: THE EU LAW OF COMPE-
TITION ¶ 7.143-7.234 (3rd ed. 2014).
278. See supra note 272.
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But when the pricing mechanism is missing, because products and ser-
vices are offered for free, a substitute reward in lieu of rents must be found,
otherwise one risks upsetting the incentivizing mechanism of free markets.
Exploitation of the complementarities between a firm’s products and ser-
vices, and even lock-in effects of covering multiple consumer needs in dif-
ferent markets by urging and facilitating them to use products and services
of the same firm, can fill that gap.279 Technology-driven platform markets, in
particular, are often criticized for initially providing a no-strings-attached
environment for services and applications to grow, and then engaging in
exclusionary acts to promote their own products and services when the
ecosystem has established its position in the market. While this appears an-
ticompetitive (and it can be), it is worth noting that it is often difficult for
technology-driven platform actors to know when and where along the value
chain they will be able to generate revenue, and therefore, a shift in strategy
using the leverage of whatever market power they have amassed in a given
layer may be necessary to maintain the incentive of joining the value chain
in the first place. While it is often assumed that as long as a firm generates
value by offering its products, it will also appropriate that value, the link
between doing business (i.e. providing products and services), and generat-
ing revenue is not always clear. As Teece has elaborately explained, value
appropriation is far from automatic, and it often requires firms to exercise
control in various parts of the value chain to prevent value generated by their
products and services being appropriated by other firms in the value chain.280
One could argue that advertising revenue can help appropriate the value
generated by free products and services, but not all free products and ser-
vices come with advertisements.281 Affiliated products and services, how-
ever, might, and this is what builds the case for the joint promotion of these
products and services to the exclusion of others. Similarly, the joint promo-
tion of products and services by the same firm can nurture the creation and
adoption of an ecosystem in which the value generated by one component of
the ecosystem can subsidize another, which by itself is not capable of gener-
279. Christoph Zott & Raphael Amit, Business Model Design: An Activity System Per-
spective, 43 LONG RANGE PLAN. 216, 221–22 (2010) (where the authors discuss the NICE
design theme on value generation: Novelty, Lock-In, Complementarities, Efficiency. They
provide Apple as an example: “A prominent example is Apple, which used to be focused on
the production of innovative hardware such as personal computers. Through the development
of the iPod and the associated music download business iTunes, Apple was the first electronics
company that included music distribution as an activity (content novelty), linking it to the
development of the iPod hardware and software (structure novelty), and digitizing it and
thereby pushing many subactivities of legal music downloads to its customers (governance
novelty). That is, Apple expanded the locus of its innovation from the product to its business
model.”).
280. See Teece, supra note 256, at 292.
281. ALEXANDER OSTERWALDER & YVES PIGNEUR, BUSINESS MODEL GENERATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR VISIONARIES, GAME CHANGERS, AND CHALLENGERS 92–101 (2010).
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ating revenue (perhaps because it is not separately or sufficiently valued by
consumers).
Under the circumstances, another way of looking at exclusionary prac-
tices is as the dominant firm’s means of appropriating the value it generates
while succeeding in the market. The ability to exercise that privilege is what
motivates the firm to succeed in the first place (much like monopoly rents).
Under this light, what can pass as normal, on the merits competition
changes: if dominance has been attained meritoriously, if the dominant firm
cannot play the pricing game, and if effective competition is not fully de-
stroyed, then expanding the concept of normal competition to include such
potentially exclusionary acts as tying, discrimination, full-line forcing, etc.,
would be a step in the direction of reflecting the special competitive dynam-
ics and strategies in digital platform markets, where products and services
are commonly traded for free and where externalities between products and
services of the same firm allow firms to offer greater variety to consumers.
This conclusion is not a free pass for firms to engage in potentially an-
ticompetitive acts. The conditions set above are not necessarily easy to sat-
isfy. But it may be easy to overlook what normal competition is in digital
markets by simply looking at how one traditionally understands normal
competition.
B. Rapid Experimentation and the Need for Risk Management
As mentioned in Part 3, a number of factors that characterize digital
markets contribute to increased mobility and inter-market expansion (e.g.,
technological proximity, flexible locus of functionality, vertical pressure,
and multistakeholderism). The effect identified above was that under the cir-
cumstances of increased mobility and expansion, exclusion is less likely to
generate anticompetitive effects because it is easier for competitors to supply
the market with what the excluding firm attempts to deprive it of.
The same characteristics also give rise to a different effect, which relates
to firms’ business models in digital markets and by extension to what can be
considered normal competition in such markets. Heightened mobility and
inter-market expansion also means that firms tend to attempt entry and be
present in multiple markets. This increases opportunities, as well as risk and
exposure. Much like in any other market situation, firms in digital markets
do not and cannot know in advance which markets they will succeed in, but
in digital markets—for the reasons explained above—it is easier to try. The
enhanced conditions of experimentation create a concomitant heightened
need for risk management.
One way to minimize risk is for firms to create ties between their vari-
ous products and services, so that risk is dispersed among them, and the
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success of one can support the suboptimal performance of others.282 Bun-
dling and joint promotion also help with adoption and risk management on
the demand side, as consumers are also hesitant to adopt new products, espe-
cially in high-technology markets.283
Importantly, because, as explained in Part 3.1, the boundaries of digital
markets are malleable, because the power flow between players in different
but complementary markets changes often, and because the architectural
shape of products and services in digital markets is protean, the achievement
of a measure of success in a given market provides less assurance of a stable
competitive advantage. These conditions make it more justifiable, if not im-
perative, to engage in practices that tie the potential success in one market to
another.
Indeed, as Table 3 shows, five of the most active digital firms (Amazon,
Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft) are today present in multiple markets,
to which they expanded rapidly and successively, allowing them to jointly
promote their products, often to the exclusion of competitors from their
ecosystem. A number of interesting observations can be made about how
these companies compete.
First, the speed of entry into multiple markets is astonishing, with com-
panies entering new markets every few years. Staying ahead of competition,
when the norm is expanding into new markets within such short timeframes,
can mean that there is little time to calculate risk and business opportunities.
In turn, this suggests that under the circumstances, an own-product favorit-
ism approach can be expected as a counter-measure.
Second, while these five firms all started from a different market origi-
nally, today they exhibit a significant overlap in activities; it is obvious from
the table that they have all expanded into each other’s line of business. One
explanation is that, because systems competition is prevalent in digital mar-
kets, firms are pressured to enter adjacent markets and promote their prod-
ucts as bundles for fear that, if a rival firm dominates one component of the
system, dominance can easily spill over to the rest of the system as well,
thereby quickly marginalizing rival firms in multiple markets (this concern
is related to the leveraging theory). This is regardless of their respective
originating market. A firm that remains absent from one of those component
markets or keeps it separate from the rest of its products and services is
therefore a firm at a disadvantage. Because it remains unknown which com-
ponent will become most valuable, firms have an incentive to enter as many
282. Gary D. Eppen, Ward A. Hanson & Martin Kipp, Bundling - New Products, New
Markets, Low Risk, 32 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7, 8–11 (1991) (where the authors discuss the
different ways by which bundling can help a company lower costs, limit risk, expand into new
markets, and become more efficient).
283. Shikhar Sarin, Trina Sego & Nataporn Chanvarasuth, Strategic Use of Bundling for
Reducing Consumers’ Perceived Risk Associated with the Purchase of New High-Tech Prod-
ucts, 11 J. MKTG. THEORY PRAC. 71 (2003).
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 Amazon Apple Facebook Google Microsoft 
Advertising platform • (2002) • (2009/2012) • (2003) • (2006) 
AI assistant app • (2015) • (2014) • (2017) • (2016) • (2014) 
AI assistant devices • (2015) • (2016) 
AI infrastructure • (2015) • (2015) 
App store • (2011) • (2008) • (2007) • (2008) • (2009/2010) 
Browser • (2011) • (2003) • (2008) • (1995) 
Cloud services (businesses) • (2006) • (2011) • (2010) 
Cloud services (consumers) • (2011) • (2011) • (2012) • (2007) 
Computer accessories • (1977) • (2016) • (2014) • (1982) 
Content distribution • (1998/2007) • (2001) • (2006/2011) • (1996) 
E-commerce • (1994) • (2007) 
Maps • (2012) • (2005) • (2010) 
Messaging/chat • (2011) • (2011) • (2005) • (1996/1999) 
Office tools • (1979) • (2006) • (1983) 
OS (Desktop) • (1978/1984) • (2011) • (1981/1985) 
OS (Mobile) • (2012) • (2007) • (2008) • (2010) 
Payment services • (2014) • (2015) • (2011) 
PC • (1978) 
Physical retail • (2015) • (2001) • (2009) 
Search (general) • (1997) • (1998/2005) 
Search (specialized) • (1994/2002) • (2013) • (2002) • (2009) 
Smartphones • (2014) • (2007) • (2010/2016) • (2010) 
Social networks • (2004) • (2010) 
Tablets • (2011) • (2010) • (2012/2016) • (2012) 
TABLE 3 (BASED ON TABLE 1): MARKETS IN WHICH AAFGM ARE PRE-
SENT, DATES OF ENTRY, ORIGINATING MARKET (IN LIGHT GREY),
MAIN PROFIT SOURCE TODAY (DARK GREY).
markets as possible compared to their competitors and spread risk among
them by tying them together to the exclusion of rival components. This way,
they will have gained some foothold in multiple markets in case one or more
of them prove decisive.
For example, Amazon Echo and Google Home both combine an AI app
engine and the physical device and both integrate with the companies’ re-
spective content and other services but not with each other’s. The strategy
here is to build an AI ecosystem around each firm’s products and services to
the exclusion of those of the rival firm, rather than give users the ability to
mix and match. This is reasonable. Amazon and Google entered the AI app
and AI devices market about the same time, and it is uncertain whether con-
sumers will value more the AI app component and abilities or the AI device
features (e.g., its ability to integrate with other services, quality of hardware,
additional features, etc.). Bundling the two components relieves firms from
taking separate risks and rewards them for their cumulative effort in
innovation.
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Third, the markets these firms originated in are not the markets that
drive most of their profits today (in Table 3 above, light grey is originating
market, dark grey is most profitable market). For example, Amazon started
as an e-commerce service, but it is its cloud and virtual infrastructure ser-
vices that drive most of its profits today. Similarly, Apple started as a per-
sonal computer manufacturer, but the main profit source today is the iPhone
line, and Microsoft started as an operating system company, but it is mostly
its productivity tools and cloud and infrastructure services that drive profits.
With high rates of innovation, rapid creation and expansion of markets, and
shifting consumer preferences, profitability in digital markets is volatile. Be-
cause ensuring a stable source of revenue is challenging, and because digital
markets are characterized by a strong pressure toward free or freemium busi-
ness models, it makes sense for firms to create dependencies between their
products and services so that cross-subsidies absorb the risk of entry and
expansion.284
The above justifications are clearly not applicable in every business con-
text, and they can be overridden by other considerations. But what is impor-
tant to take away from this section is that the concept of normal on the
merits competition is one that has to be determined in the context of the
industry under scrutiny, and to do that one needs to take into account the
business models that seem to be driving industry practice and evolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis brought together two key elements of digital
markets: the business practice of exclusion and the role of technology in
informing its antitrust and regulatory treatment. While a lot has been written
on regulation and antitrust policy in technology-intensive markets, the ma-
jority of that work is concerned with the “new economy” aspects of those
markets, whereas the technological aspects have received patchy attention. I
attempted to extend and enrich the ways by which technological aspects of
digital markets affect the analysis of exclusion, to bring them under a unified
framework of analysis, and to introduce scholarship from technology, man-
agement, and economics studies that has so far remained underused in or
absent from the legal and policy debates.
The general direction observed is that, as regards the technology factor
in digital markets, exclusionary behavior becomes less likely to distort com-
petition, because of the effect of the structural preconditions of anticompeti-
tive exclusion: the demand and supply conditions in the market must be such
that accord firms the ability to foreclose a significant line of commerce; the
exclusionary practice and its results must be able to persist for a potent
284. See, e.g., Kent Walker, Android: Choice at Every Turn, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD
(Nov. 10, 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/android-choice-competition-re
sponse-europe.
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amount of time as to justify intervention; the exclusionary practice should
not constitute normal on the merits competition.
What was attempted to be shown respectively is that the technology-
intensive nature of the industry creates more sources of competition and
more ways to bypass bottlenecks, making effective exclusion harder; that the
competitive advantage which accords the necessary power to engage in an-
ticompetitive exclusion may be harder to maintain; and that some exclusion-
ary practices that appear anticompetitive can in fact be normal and expected
ways for firms to compete in digital markets. Taken together, these consider-
ations will provide courts and authorities an adapted framework by which to
understand exclusion in digital markets.
